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A
DISCOURSE K

Of the DANGER of Governing by

One Minister.

In which is demonstrated,

That the most advantageous
Administration, both for the KING
and the PEOPLE, consists in an
Establishment of

Many Councils ;

OR, A

POLYSYNODY.

Done into *English*.

L O N D O N,

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One Minister

without Check or Warrants in the kind
two Persons only in his Affairs, each
A Prince may take the Advice of
Minister a Vice-Prince.

For Brevity sake, therefore, I shall call
him whom they stile Grand-Vizier,
as the grand Seigneur, even now, does
under the name of First Minister, and
trusted solely Cardinal de Richelieu,
who for eighteen or twenty Years en-
Raced, and passed the Years XIII.
as also did the Kings of the third
those they called the Kings of the Palace;
the first and second Kings of France of
A Prince may hearken to the
Advice of one single Per-
son in Affairs of State, and
Prince may hearken to the

P R E F A C E.

A Prince may hearken to the Advice of one single Person in Affairs of State, and vest him alone with his whole Authority, just as the Kings of *France* of the first and second Race did entrust those they called Mayors of the Palace: as also did some Kings of the third Race, and particularly *Lewis XIII.* who for eighteen or twenty Years entrusted solely Cardinal *de Richelieu*, under the name of First Minister; and as the grand Seigneur, even now, does him whom they style Grand-Vizier. For Brevity sake, therefore, I shall call this Form of Administration by one Minister a Viziership.

A Prince may take the Advice of two Persons only in his Affairs, each without Check or Witness in the kind

of Business he is entrusted with ; and thus divide his Authority between them much in the same manner as we have seen it shared between the late Monsieur *Colbert* and Monsieur *de Louvois*. And this sort of Administration by several Ministers I shall call in the Sequel of this Discourse a *Demi-Visiership*.

This Prince might, moreover, put his Authority into the hands of four, or eight, or even a greater number of Ministers, pretty near equal in Power ; But as those would in reality be but different sorts of *Demi-Visiers*, I conclude all these Forms of Administration under the name of a *Demi-Visiership*.

Lastly, a Prince may, in every Affair of State, take the Advice in Council of every Member of that Assembly, and apportion out the seven or eight chief Branches of State-Affairs, to as many Councils, or Assemblies. This Form of a Ministry may be called a *Multitude of Councils*, or a *Polysynody*.

nody. And this is in a great measure what the late Regent framed with so much Wildom, and in a few Weeks put in execution with so much Resolution and Conduct.

I own, *1st*. That a Polysynody may degenerate by degrees into a Demi-Visiership, or even into a Visiership. And *2^{dly}*. That in case the Members be ill chosen, they may be corrupted as well as the Visiers, or the Demi-Visiers, and may prefer their own private Interests to those of the Publick, *i. e.* to the Interests of the King and Kingdom. *3^{dly}*. That the Will of him alone, who sits upon the Throne, is the only present security a Nation can have of the continuance of this admirable Form of Government. And the only Prospect they can have of its being supported afterwards for any length of time, must be from the Will of the Kings that shall succeed one another. *4^{thly}*. That if nothing be added to this settled Form, it will be only proper for Princes, that have Ap-

plication to Business and Industry, (Qualities very rarely to be found in Kings) for it will ill agree with Princes who are unindustrious, and have but slender Capacities for Business, and much less with Princes either too young, or too old, too weak, or who are abandoned to Luxury and Pleasure. Now two thirds of the time which Monarchies generally last, is filled up with such Princes; it were therefore to be wished, that the Polysynody of Monarchies were brought to that Perfection, that neither the Weakness nor Decay of Parts in the Sovereign, might weaken the Monarchy it self, that the Intervals of Inactivity, Folly, and Indiscretion of these Princes, might never be prejudicial to their own Families, or to the State; and that the Intervals of Application, Industry, Prudence, and Wisdom, in the former, might always with ease procure to their own Families, and to the State, the most considerable Advantages.

Now I take upon me to shew, that
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these four Inconveniencies may be avoided, and for that purpose, I intend in this Treatise to point out the most easy and effectual Means. I hope the Reader will see at the same time, that a Polysynody brought to no greater degree of Perfection than as we have shewn, is a Form of Government infinitely preferable to a Visiership or a Demi-Visiership. And this is one of the Motives I had in setting about this Work; for I think it the Duty of every good Citizen, to make the Government he lives under, both esteem'd and lov'd, especially when it is considerably better than that which went before it.

We must not here confound two things which are very different, viz. the Government of a single Visier, with the Visiership it self: For it may so happen, that a Visier may be a Person of an exalted Genius, have an excellent Mind, be of the strongest Constitution, extremely laborious, and renowned for his Temperance; it is

possible that he may have no View of enriching himself, and of raising his Family, his Relations, or his Friends; but be constantly, and with Zeal and Vigour, entirely taken up in administering Justice, and promoting the Interests of the King and Kingdom; he may moreover possibly prefer these publick Concerns to his own Reputation. But there is a wide difference between the wonderful Administration of such a Visier for twenty or thirty Years, and the Visiership it self, which I look upon as a settled Form of Government, supposed to subsist as long as the Nation; and which almost always falls into the hands of the most ambitious Men; and who are prone to Revenge, Jealousy, and to other Vices incident to human Nature, and who endeavour to enrich themselves, their Relations and their Friends, and to raise their Creatures, who are obliged to be more solicitous to support the Power of the Visier, than to promote the Interest of King or Kingdom. The Visiership therefore

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is

is a Form of Government, in which
 out of a hundred Visiers, there will not
 be found one Man perfect in ninety-
 nine; and he may have very indifferent
 Qualifications, or may sometimes prove
 either very incapable, or even very mil-
 chievous. Thus the Arguments, which
 prove that the Government of an ac-
 complish'd and perfect Visier is prefe-
 rable to a Polyfynody, prove nothing
 for the Visiership it self, where it is so
 rare a thing to find Visiers that are so
 qualified: And then I maintain, that
 such a Visier could do nothing more
 serviceable, than to settle, before he
 died, a Polyfynody in the very State
 he had governed.

Moreover, it is not to be imagin'd
 but that a Polyfynody in the general,
 is infinitely preferable to a Visiership,
 tho a particular Polyfynody may be
 defective, chiefly in the first Years of
 its Establishment, and in a Kingdom
 where every thing was out of order
 when it was first settled there. It is
 not to be expected that so vast a De-
 sign,

fign, which as yet has had no perfect
 Model in any part of the World, can
 grow up in so short a time to a state of
 Perfection. And therefore I have
 engaged in this Work with no other
 design, than to furnish some hints to-
 wards finishing so glorious a Scheme.
 I had formed in my Mind, a great
 part of the Notions you will find in
 this Treatise, nine or ten Years before
 the late King's Death. Now the Rea-
 der is satisfied, that it had been of ve-
 ry dangerous consequence to me, and
 of very little service to the State, to
 have publish'd them at that time: But
 happily Affairs have taken another
 turn since; I have therefore resum'd
 my Work, to contribute all I can to-
 wards the bringing so noble an Esta-
 blishment to perfection.
 I could not set all the Advantages
 of a Polytynody in a proper light,
 without shewing that this Form of
 Government is not liable to the great
 Inconveniences of a Demi-Whorship.
 Now how was it possible to do this,
 with-

without looking back into some of the Misfortunes of the late Reign on the one hand, and without shewing on the other, That the sole Cause of all those Misfortunes was, because the late King was frequently misinformed by the Demi-Visiorship in several matters of fact of the greatest consequence, and because in most Affairs, either ordinary or extraordinary, he had generally the Assistance but of one single Person, whose Interest is generally was, to engage him in the worst Measures, rather than make him take the best. So that it is matter of Astonishment, that with so imperfect a Form of Government, he did not commit more Faults than he did, and that he alone should be able to make head against so many formidable Powers, which he had arm'd against himself; to avoid the ill Effects of so much bad Council, and to escape the Poison of so many Flatterers, who were too well qualified, and too deeply engaged in Interest to corrupt and spoil him.

What

What had he not done for his own
 Glory and our Happiness, had he, who
 had such noble Views, known at the
 Death of Cardinal *Mazarin*, the great
 Advantages of a Polyfynody?
 As it may happen in some future
 Reigns, that a Favourite, or a Mistress,
 may endeavour to set up again in
France the Government by Mayors of
 the Palace, and that some of our Kings,
 for want of knowing their true Inter-
 ests, and those of their People, may
 be tempted to overthrow this excel-
 lent Form of Government by a mul-
 titude of Councils: I thought it of the
 greatest consequence to the service of
 the State, to put into the hands of all
 good *Frenchmen* a well reason'd Dis-
 course, of the great Advantages that
 would accrue to the King from thence
 on the one hand, and which the Sub-
 ject might expect on the other; that
 this salutary Persuasion might take the
 deepest root in all their Minds, and
 thereby make it more easy for Men of
 probity to ward off a blow by their
 Advice,

Advice, when the case should happen, which would prove so pernicious to the Nation, so dangerous for the King himself, and so fatal in the issue to the Royal Family.

This Treatise is divided into two Parts. The first contains a Particular of all the Advantages of a Polysynody above a Visitation or a Demi-Visitation. The second contains the Objections that have been made to me, and my Answers to them, with all the Elucidations I thought were proper to bring a Polysynody to a State of Perfection.

I heartily wish that some body, for the clearing the Truth in this important Subject, would write, not against me, for no body ought to be fond of Personal Disputes, but against this Work. I know very well that Political Subjects are very susceptible of the Ornaments of Eloquence, and that Rhetorical Discourses make strong Impressions upon vulgar Minds. But I have always thought, that the Method
of

of Orators rather strikes the Imagination, and strengthens the Passions, than creates just and distinct Ideas, or increases the Knowledge of the Reader. It is much more proper to engage the Heart by the nice disposition of sprightly and lively Colourings, than to convince the Mind by an uninterrupted chain of solid and just Reasoning: therefore I keep to that Style which is proper to Geometricians, and to their Method, which is simple, and has this great Convenience, That the Reader's Mind is not dazzled by too lively and bewitching Images; but may easily find out, if the Proof of a Proposition be a Sophism, or a true Demonstration; an Advantage not to be met with in Rhetorical Discourses, where the Proof is so dress'd up in Tropes and Figures, so blended with bad Argument, that there is no finding the true Force of the Reasoning, without taking the whole Discourse to pieces. And therefore we see, that these beautiful Compositions last no longer than
 till

all a more finish'd Piece appears, from
some hand that undertakes to prove
the contrary: whereas a Truth once
demonstrated, continues so for ever,
and to all sorts of Readers.

Upon this account I think my self
obliged to desire those, who after read-
ing my Performance, are still for the
System of the Vifiership or Demi-Vi-
fiership, and design to write against the
Polyfynody, to make use of the Me-
thod I have follow'd; and thus to
confine themselves to engage with e-
qual Weapons, and not to write in the
lofty strain of Declaimers, nor make
use of the strokes of a delicate and
keen Satyr, which diverts, but proves
nothing, and proceed with Plainness
and Method, by dividing and defining,
and by the necessary, tho common,
Terms of *Primo*, *Secundo*, that the
Reader may compare, with the greater
ease, my Proofs with theirs; or, if
they please, my Objections with theirs,
and find the Advantages one System
has over the other.

In a word, I look upon this Tract only as a rough Draught, I have not had time to shorten it, nor set in order the Parts, as I could wish. But the chief hints are here, and that is enough for every honest and impartial Mind, who is no otherwise concern'd in the Question, but to see the Truth well demonstrated.

And design to write against the Polytheists, to make use of the Method I have followed; and thus to convince themselves to engage with a good Writer, and not to write in the style of Declamers, nor make use of the strokes of a delicate and

learned Satyr, which divides the Reader, and proceeds with the same Method, by dividing and conquering, and by the necessity of a constant and regular use of the same, the Reader is brought to a certain degree of habit, and is enabled to follow the Author in his reasoning, and to see the force of his arguments. A Reader may observe, that the Author does not use the same Method in every Part of the Tract, but that he varies it, and that he sometimes uses a more direct and sometimes a more indirect Method. But this is only because the Author is sometimes more concerned to convince, and sometimes more concerned to amuse, and that he varies his Method accordingly.

In

DISCOURSE

Concerning a

POLYSYNODY.

PART I.

The Advantages of a Polysynody, in preference to a Visiership or a Demi-Visiership.

IT is incontestable, that the Form of Government by a Polysynody ought to be prefer'd to a Visiership or a Demi-Visiership; if on the one hand, a Polysynody has a great many considerable Advantages, which cannot be found in the other two; and on the other hand, there be no considerable Advantages in them, which is not to be found in a Polysynody. Now I undertake fully to demonstrate this, That a Polysynody has a great many Advantages, which are not to be found in a Visiership, &c. and that a Visiership, &c. has none, but what are in a Polysynody; there-

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fore a Polysynody ought upon all Accounts to have the preference. But to enter upon Particulars.

ADVANTAGE I.

The Resolutions of State will not be so often founded upon Errors in matters of Fact, and therefore will be a great deal less faulty.

I Suppose the Matter in debate is, whether War ought to be declared against a certain Prince? or an Alliance ought to be concluded with another upon certain Conditions? The Determination good or bad, that the King may take, depends upon the knowledge of a great many Facts, which are of the last consequence in the decision. If he, who is to make the report to the King, is himself ignorant of some of the Facts; or without Design supposes some true, that are false; or with Design, conceals a part of them, and misrepresents others; and makes his Report to the King privately and without Witnesses: And if the King cannot possibly come at the truth of those Facts, but from such a Report, let his Judgment be never so good, he must of necessity take his Resolution upon a supposition, that the Report made to him is true. Inasmuch, that whether the Minister, or he that makes the Report, has a mind to deceive him, or be himself the first deceived in relation to the Facts, which he makes a Report of; the King will be deceived, and chuse the worst side, by an Error in Matters of Fact.

Let

Let the Matter in debate be, of two Designs, to chuse one that will be the most advantageous, and the least expensive ; or to chuse one amongst different Mediums to compass a certain End or Design : as for instance, to appoint the best Officers Civil or Military, or the most proper Persons for foreign Negotiations, &c. or the most equitable Methods for raising a Tax, &c. In a word, the greatest part of the Resolutions which a King may take in the Government of his Kingdom, depends upon his Knowledge of Facts. And in general, it may be said, that we embrace very few Opinions, either true or false, but upon the Supposition of the Truths of Facts, which are very often false. It is therefore evident, that the King, who in these Circumstances cannot come to the knowledge of the material Facts, but by the Channel of one Man, who speaks to him in private, must of necessity be a great deal oftner deceived, than if the same Person always spoke to him in the Presence of many. 1st, Because this Person would take more care in informing himself, and would make his Report with more Circumspection, lest he should be accused of a shameful neglect. 2^{dly}, Because he would be afraid to be found out, and condemned as guilty of Collusion, should he misrepresent them, and set them in a false light. 3^{dly}, Because, supposing there were eight or ten Men in the Council, of distinguish'd Parts, and consummate Knowledge in Business, many of them would be able to shew the Falseness of several Facts, which he perhaps, without any ill Design, might represent as true. 4^{thly}, These State-Counsellors would be by so much the better qualified to judge of these Facts, if each of them

in their turn were employ'd in that Species of Business, which he, that makes the Report, is entrusted in, as I shall shew by and by.

Now, since generally the Resolutions of Councils are ground'd upon the Supposition of several Facts, and those who give their opinion in them, will be a great deal less subject to mistakes in Fact, because they will be able to inform one another every day; we may conclude, that the Resolutions, in regard to the Government of the State, will be much less faulty; and by consequence the best measures will be more frequently taken in them, than by any other possible Method whatsoever. Nor will he, who is to make the Report, be tempted to disguise the Truth, tho his private Interest should prompt him to it, lest it should be in vain; and for fear the Assembly should suspect him of Collusion, and Dissimulation, in the Report he makes. And thus the Decisions in Affairs of State will suffer a great deal less from Mistakes in Fact.

As it highly concerns the Visiers, and Demi-Visiers to keep always the Knowledge of Facts in their own hands, they take particular care never to read to the King the Letters they receive from the Officers, Civil or Military, or from Persons in the Provinces either of a publick or private Character. They only read Abstracts, form'd according to their own Views. And to justify this Proceeding, they say, That those Papers are for the most part long and tedious, and are generally loaded with needless Matter, and Reasonings, of which the King hath not time to hear a tenth part read. But this Inconvenience will be avoided in a Polysynody; for each Council will have time enough to have all these important Dispatches read throughout;

throughout: and thus the pernicious Custom of taking Abstracts will be abolish'd, the Resolutions of Council will not be so often ground'd upon Errors in Matters of Fact, or upon the Misrepresentations of a Visier, or a Demi-Visier, whose Interests very often are opposite to the publick Interest. And this is the first Advantage a Polysynody has over a Visiership.

ADVANTAGE II.

A greater Knowledge of Means and Expedients.

THERE are a great many Affairs, in which the grand Point is, to find out the most proper Means to avoid, or to lessen an Evil, or to procure, or improve a Good: Is it not evident, that ten Persons will find out more Expedients and Means, will examine them with greater Exactness, and come to a Resolution in the Choice, with more security; and particularly, if you suppose them pretty near equal in their Parts and Qualifications? And in making this Hypothesis, I suppose nothing but what is very possible. And I shall hereafter shew, that it would be very easy for the King to chuse with safety the best among Men of approved Merit: Now, one may well say, that such as are the best, are pretty near equal: for if one of them sees farther in one sort of Business than another does, yet the latter may have the same Advantage of him in Business of another kind.

As long Dispatches upon Affairs of the greatest Importance will be read throughout in

the Councils, Expedients will be very frequently found in them, which will be the more worthy of Attention, as they are proposed by Men, who are upon the spot, and by consequence have a nearer View of all that passes.

3. Contrariety of Opinions is the most effectual means of Knowledge: Because the Uneasiness arising from Contradiction, sets the Mind in quest of new Proofs; and to that end makes it exert it self, which otherwise would never happen; and very often, without this extraordinary Effort, the Truth, or at least the Demonstration of the Truth, would remain undiscover'd: Now there is no such thing as Contradiction, properly speaking, but among equals; how then can a Prince, who applies himself to Business with his Visier only, expect to be inform'd by being contradicted? I know the late King held Councils sometimes, but the Members were never absolutely free, because they were too dependent on the chief Ministers, and by consequence were not absolutely free to contradict them.

4. If there is any one in a Council of a more elevated Genius, and more distinguish'd for his Probity than the rest, he will insensibly inspire those who follow him close, with his own way of thinking; he will also enlarge their Minds, and they, being thus improv'd, will in their turn set this superior Genius in the right, when, thro' Inadvertency, he shall be out of the way. And this is the second Advantage a Polysynody has over the Visiership or the Demi-Visiership.

ADVANTAGES
And to convince them how much the
greater Advantages, as they are in favour, and
And who does not know that these private interests are

ADVANTAGE III.

*Private Interest will not so often clash
with the Publick Good.*

THE greater Good and Interest of the King and State, ought always to be the Object of the Deliberations of the Council. The only thing that can divert him who gives his opinion from this Object, is some private Interest, that is very often opposite to the publick Good: The Minister that declares his Opinion before the King without Witnesses, may very often by several false Suggestions, and divers plausible Pretexts, persuade the King to an unjust and odious War, for instance, or to some Undertaking far less advantageous than another, because it tends to promote the private Interest of the Minister. The late Reign affords us but too many Examples of the Evils which the private Interests of the Ministers, and their Envy, have produc'd, against the Interest of the King and Kingdom. I will not instance in any one of them, because I would give offence to no Man without necessity, and because there is no need of Examples, to shew that it is natural, and that nothing is more common, than for Ministers to have Passions, to endeavour to raise their Families, to love their Relations, and their Friends, to hate their Enemies, to fear and endeavour to destroy their Rivals, and to contrive their Ruin with so much the greater Eagerness, as they are in favour, and raised by Merit, and in Reputation. And who does not know, that these private Interests are

to be met with in a hundred Affairs, either particular or general, directly opposite, to the Laws of common Justice, and the common Good, will be known, that the Counsellors in the several Councils will be Men, as well as these Visiers and Demi-Visiers, and that they may have Interests contrary to the Publick, and that such a one amongst them would be willing to prefer his Interest to the Good of the State, could he do it as easily as a Visier or a Demi-Visier can, who give their Opinions without Witnesses : But he giving his in an Assembly, in which all the Counsellors are very clear-sighted, and cannot all be supposed to have the same private Interest against the Good of the State. It is evident, it would be in vain for such a one to persuade the rest ; and by taking the worst side, all he would gain, would be to render himself suspected of Corruption and Unfaithfulness. He might indeed swerve from his Duty, had he none to observe him, but he will never attempt it, whilst he has such Lookers on. He will rather make a Virtue of necessity, and have the Honour in so publick a manner to sacrifice his private Interest to the common Good. As to Love to his Country, it is true, he will be an Hypocrite, but his Hypocrisy will be uniform and constant : Now the constant and uniform Imitation of a Virtue, will, upon the whole, have much the same Effects for the Good of Society, as the Virtue it self, because the Interest of preferring Reputation, which is a private Interest, that makes a very strong Impression, will oblige him to act constantly for the publick Good : And this Consideration, that a Man acts very differently, when he has a great many clear-sighted Judges, who are Witnesses

nesses of his Conduct, than when he is not seen, judg'd, or condemned by any body; will shew an infinite difference between a Visiership, or a Demi-Visiership, on the one hand; and a Polysynody on the other, in regard to the true Interest of the King, and the publick Good; and will always make a Polysynody infinitely preferable to any other form of Government.

ADVANTAGE IV.

Excessive Taxes less to be fear'd, and the Publick Money employ'd to greater Advantage.

FIRST, Publick Taxes and Subsidies are very often carried to an insupportable Excess; and this is occasioned, not so much by the real Wants of the State, as by the too great Inclination of the Prince for needless Expences, and granting Pensions; which must be levied upon poor Families, whose Labour supports the State.

The King would certainly avoid these Expences, and retrench three parts in four of the Pensions, could he be made sensible of the extremity of Misery the greatest part of his Subjects are brought to, by means of these Pensions; and what can be more evident, than that a Council in a Body may give the King such Information, with less reason to fear the Consequences of it, and with greater Facility and more Boldness give him a very natural and true Account of the matters of Fact that may come before them, than a fawning Visier or Demi-Visier can do, who may be afraid of being

turned out of place for making such Representations.

2^{dly}. The Visiers, or Demi-Visiers, who have within their Commissions the care of the Buildings, publick Festivals, and the Extraordinaries of the King's Household, may by several ways make considerable Advantages of these extraordinary Expences; therefore they will be very far from dissuading the King from them by any proper Representation: notwithstanding it often happens, that these prodigious Expences in needless things *very frequently* incapacitate the King afterwards from regulating other things, which are of the greatest Necessity and Importance to his own Interest.

3^{dly}. The Counsellors of the Council for the Revenue do pay their share of the Taxes, and have none in the Profit of laying them out; they are therefore more interested to let the King into a true Knowledge of the Misery of the People, than ever the Demi-Visiers can be.

4^{thly}. There are extraordinary Expences in a State highly reasonable to be made, which generally can't be supply'd, but from the Money which remains every Year after the current Charges and ordinary Debts are quite clear'd: Now if there is a Council, where all extraordinary Undertakings, and new Projects, shall be propos'd, and set in due order, according to the greater or less Advantage the King and State may expect from them. When the King is inform'd by such a Council, of the great Advantage that will accrue from such a Project, he will be much more inclined to lay out the Exceedings of the publick Money to such an use, than to lay them out in unnecessary Expences. So that a Polysynody may well be said to be
 ed more

more adapted, than the Visiership or Demi-Visiership, towards maintaining the sacred Union that ought always to be between the Designs of the Person of him that governs, and the Interest of the governed: and by consequence excessive Taxes will be less to be fear'd, and the publick Moneys will be better employ'd to the publick Good.

ADVANTAGE V.

There will be more useful Regulations and Orders settled and established.

VERY often, under a Visiership, or a Demi-Visiership, several very desirable Regulations and Settlements are proposed for the good of the State: But the Visiers, and Demi-Visiers, being over-charg'd with the current and urgent Affairs, they have not sufficient leisure to consider seriously all the Reasons for a new Project, to weigh exactly the Advantages against the Disadvantages, and to examine with attention the proper means to bring them to bear. They are not Masters of the time that is requisite for such an Examination; whereas in a Polysynody, the current and ordinary Business is divided into so many hands, that each of them have twenty, nay thirty times more leisure to allow for the examining a new Project, than the others have.

It is very often the Interest of a Visier, or a Demi-Visier, to oppose a good Regulation, or a good Settlement: But in a Polysynody, if a useful Project is not proposed by one Member, who has a private Interest not to do it, it may
be

be propos'd by another, who has no such reason; and at the same time he, who refuseth to undertake to move it in Council, will not dare to oppose it there, lest he be suspected of basely preferring an inconsiderable Interest of his own to a great and publick Good.

3^{dly}. A Visier or a Demi-Visier often rejects a good Regulation or Settlement, thro' ill-grounded Prejudices, which puts a Stop to the whole; because no body is allow'd to oppose them with Vigour: whereas in a Council, where the Members are independant of one another, these ill-grounded Prejudices are discuss'd, and examin'd with Freedom; they are clear'd up by degrees, and so cease to be hindrances to the good Regulations.

4^{thly}. A Demi-Visier often opposes a good Regulation or Settlement, thro' Jealousy, because his Competitor moved it; lest he, by doing so great a Service to the State, should by his Success procure himself a great deal of Honour. Whereas in a Polysynody, whosoever should oppose thro' Envy a good Regulation or Settlement, without having good Arguments to support such his Opposition, might have just reason to fear, lest his Envy should be expos'd in full Council; he therefore would never oppose it openly, if he saw the Majority against him, and that his Opposition would only procure him Blame.

5^{thly}. It may happen, that some new Regulations and Settlements may require more Examination and Time, than the Members of the different Councils can afford them: Which Inconveniency the late Regent very wisely provided against, by erecting an Office for the Examination of Political Memoirs; and particularly,
when

when this Settlement has been brought to that Perfection it may easily be brought to: It is obvious to see, that the erecting such an Office can never be propos'd or agreed to by a Visier, or a Demi-Visier; and can never be settled, but under a Polysynody. From what has been said, we may fairly conclude, that this Form of Government will produce better Regulations, and more useful Settlements, than can be ever expected from a Visiership, or a Demi-Visiership, which alone is a prodigious Advantage.

ADVANTAGE VI.

Kings will be better acquainted with their own Affairs.

IT is the grand Interest of a Visier, or a Demi-Visier, who ingross the whole Authority and all the Glory of the Administration to themselves, to let the King, as little as possible, into the Knowledge of Affairs of State, which are properly his own Business; and which he is bound in Interest to improve every day; but to engage him in Amusements, and drown him in Pleasures: and every body knows, that the Visiers of the last Age never fail'd in this important Point, and that the Visiers, who are to come, will ever follow their own Interest in this Particular: Nevertheless every one sees, how much the publick Affairs suffer from the Ignorance or Indolence of the Sovereign, and what wrong he does himself, either by the great Dependance he throws himself under, or by the mean Figure he makes Abroad and at Home:

Home: For with Justice and Reason one may say, that a Visiter, who reigns, can never increase his own Glory and Authority, but at the Expence of the Glory and Authority of him that ought to reign. But the contrary to all this, is in a Polysynody: It is the great Interest of the Members of the different Councils, that the King should be often at their Meetings, because they all desire to distinguish themselves before him; and as he can't assist at them often, without being instructed, his Affairs must of Consequence, as he increases in the Knowledge of them, go on better, and of course his People will be more happy.

ADVANTAGE VII.

It will not be so easy to impose upon and deceive the King, to make him act contrary to his own Interest.

THESE different Councils would not indeed hinder the King from doing, what he pleas'd: but they would preserve him from desiring to do things, that would be hurtful to his Reputation, or his greater Happiness; for they would always carry the Torch of Truth before him, to set him in the right way, and direct him in the Choice of the best Measures, and prevent, by an increase of Light and Knowledge, his falling into those Snares, which interested Men are for ever laying in his way to deceive him. And the Habit he will acquire, of referring all Petitions, and Affairs of Government to the Deliberation and Debates of his different Councils, will hinder his committing

ting a great many of those involuntary Acts of Injustice in disposing of the Rewards of the State, and from engaging in those rash and ruinous Enterprizes, in which Princes, that seldom make use of the Light of their Counsellors do engage and embark themselves.

ADVANTAGE VIII.

The Visiership and Demi-Visiership can never be improv'd, but the Polysynody may be considerably every Day.

1st. **A**N able and virtuous Visier may succeed an ignorant and vicious one; but the Visiership is not the better upon that Account. This good Visier may make some wise Regulations and useful Ordinances; but his interested Successor may, for an inconsiderable Profit of his own, over-turn what his Predecessor has so wisely establish'd for the publick Good.

2^{dly}. The greatest part of the most advantageous Establishments are very chargeable at the Beginning, and very often do not turn to Account and Profit, till a long time after: A Man must be at the expence of Plowing and Sowing, if he expects the Increase and Profit of the Harvest. Now a Visier, that comes after, and does not expect any Honour to himself from the Settlement; but on the contrary, a great deal to his Predecessor, whose Glory he thinks it his Interest to eclipse; will chuse rather to overthrow, than support the Design. It would be easy to bring Proof of this by several Examples, but it proves it self, and it is not allowable to offend with-

without Necessity the innocent Heirs of wicked Vipers. And if I have not observ'd this Rule in other places, it is only, when I have been oblig'd, that I might establish some important Truth for the good of the Living, to have no regard for the slighter Interest of some Persons that are dead.

3^{dly}. A Visier of a warlike Disposition may follow one, who has been more inclin'd to Arts, Trade, Manufactures; and in a word, the Polity of well governing the State within, and all the other Advantages attendant upon Peace. It must of necessity follow, even without any jealousy upon account of Reputation, that all the Settlements of his Predecessor will be neglected and laid aside; and all those, that regard War, will be promoted and favour'd. And the reason is, because Visiers are mortal, Men follow one another, whilst the Principles and Maxims by which they act, are very different, and do not follow one another: whereas in a Polysynody, there are certain Principles and Maxims of State, which by degrees are settled amongst them, either from the Evidences of Reason, or from Experience in the Success of them, that are handed down, as it were by Tradition, and are imbibed by those that are admitted, as Members of those Councils, which are transmitted from the old to the young, and are of equal duration with the Company it self. And so one may say, that in spite of the Mortality of Men, good and excellent Maxims do thus become immortal, and the bad ones by degrees lose their Credit, by the bare Comparison of them with the good.

4^{thly}. Not only the good Maxims are durable and lasting, and the bad ones by degrees dis-
way

way, but the Companies themselves are every Day inventing something new, either to make their own Labour more easy and useful; or the Informations and Dispatches of the inferior Officers more clear and full; or to lessen by clearer and more comprehensive Regulations the Quantity of Business that comes before them; or in fine, to further the more ready dispatch of Business. Now this Advantage there is in a Council that never dies, that whatever of Good is found out, and approv'd upon Trial, subsists always. Thus a Polysynody improves it self every Day; whereas a Visiership and a Demi-Visiership may as well grow worse as better. And this is a prodigious Advantage, that one Form of Government has over the other.

ADVANTAGE IX.

Fewer Injuries and Insults from the more powerful.

THAT Government is undoubtedly most desirable, in which the Throne is accessible to Truth and Justice in favour of the Weak, who think themselves oppress'd and injur'd by the more Powerful: Vexation and Oppression drive old Subjects out of a Kingdom; whereas Justice and Protection invite new ones into it. Is it not evident, that this easiness of Access, which is so much desir'd by all Subjects, is increased, by increasing the Number of Ministers?

It is true, that where there is a great Facility of presenting Complaints, there are a great many made without any Foundation in Reason, and

which in themselves are petty Injuries; but it must be own'd, that in such a Country, there are much fewer Vexations and downright Oppressions, than any where else; which is a very important Point in good Government.

2dly, The Ministers themselves are generally the most formidable and most powerful Persons in a State. In the late Reigns there have been great Vexations and Persecutions from them, because there were no Protectors, either zealous, or powerful enough, to dare to take up the Cause and Defence of Justice against such Persecutors: But in a Multitude of Councils, it is a great Happiness, there are a great many Ministers powerful enough, and who have nothing to fear from their protecting Justice, and therefore it will be much better protected: and as a passionate and revengeful Minister will apprehend, lest his Colleagues should undertake the Defence of those, he has a mind to ruin; he will very often repress his Anger and Resentment, which is what a Visier, or a Demi-Visier will never do. And thus there will be much fewer outrageous Vexations, and Acts of Injustice in a Polysynody, than in a Visiership, or a Demi-Visiership, which is another very considerable Advantage.

ADVANTAGE X.

Persons of Quality and Birth will apply themselves to Affairs of State with greater Affiduity and Success.

THE Visiers, and Demi-Visiers, look upon it as a Matter of the greatest Consequence

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to their Interest, not to employ Men of Quality in their Offices under them, who may possibly supplant them afterwards, either by their personal Merit, or their Friends; or at least may succeed them, to the Exclusion of their own Children; they therefore of Consequence employ Persons of low Rank and Birth: and it often happens, that Gentlemen, who are offer'd those Places, refuse them; not because they are too mean, for they are frequently of the greatest Importance in themselves, and very honourable in regard to the Service of the King and State, and which require great Knowledge and Experience, and much Honour and Integrity; but which they decline, thro' an Aversion of being in Communion with those, who are look'd upon in the World, only as a better sort of Servants, and who are absolutely devoted to the Service, not of the King and Country, but of their Masters. No body therefore can expect to see many of the Nobility in Offices under a Visier, or Demi-Visier. And yet it must be own'd, that among the Men of Birth and Quality, are to be found the Men of the greatest Honour and Loyalty to their King, of the most inviolable Love to their Country, of the greatest Parts, the best Education and noblest Sentiments; in a word, whose Inclinations to Virtue, and other distinguish'd Qualities, are very proper to make a Ministry both esteem'd and lov'd: whereas in a Consistory, there are a great many very considerable Places, that may employ Men of the first Rank. There must of consequence needs be a greater Emulation amongst them, to endeavour to deserve a Place in the Councils by their Merit and Application to publick Business, than there can ever be, in the Visiership or Demi-Visiership;

which Emulation must necessarily turn to the great Advantage both of Subject and Sovereign. 2dly. It was a very great Inconvenience in the late Reigns, for those that had a mind to study Politicks, to find out the Memoirs and Records, that were necessary to let them into the Knowledge of the Case or Point in hand: But the Regent has, by erecting an Office for the Examination of Political Memoirs, which I mention'd above, remedy'd this Evil; which Office may, from time to time, cause to be printed the most proper Memoirs upon every Political Subject. It is evident then, that a far greater Number of Persons of Quality, upon this Foot, will apply themselves with Success to the Knowledge of State Affairs, to the great Advantage of the King and Kingdom.

ADVANTAGE XI.

The different Degrees of Merit and Abilities of each Profession will be more easily found out.

IT is of the greatest Consequence to the Strength, Riches, and Happiness of any State, that the Subjects be severally employ'd with proper Motives of Emulation, to excel each other in their particular Craft, Trade, or Profession, each in his own Class and Company. I shall endeavour, in another Place, to give a just Idea of the vast Effects, that such a general Emulation would produce; but for the present, it shall suffice to observe, that the grand Obstacle to the raising such an Emulation is, the Difficulty they, who have the disposal of Places

ces and Employments, have to find out exactly the different Degrees of Merit and Abilities, that may be serviceable to the State: I say exactly; for tho any one may see the Difference, when the Degrees of Difference are as one to an hundred; yet one must be very clear-sighted to perceive it, when the Difference is, as a hundred to a hundred and two. Yet this exact Knowledge ought to be the Ground of the exact Justice and Regard, that should be had to the Talents and Abilities of Competitors; and yet, it is this exact Justice, that kindles and foment the vigorous and settled Desire in each Man of excelling his Neighbour, which is a Matter of the greatest Consequence for Improvement in any Kind.

But who is better qualify'd to know exactly the different Degrees of Merit, than they, who are to live, converse, confer, debate and act together for many Years; for in those Circumstances each Man estimates the worth of his Neighbour. Thus in a Company of Thirty, every body has an Idea of Three, that excel the rest: and this Estimate, that is form'd in the Mind, almost imperceptibly, would be done much more exactly, if each one were oblig'd every Year to name Three, that they should judge most worthy to be promoted.

Now this Establishment, which tends to reduce every Trade and Profession into Classes, and an Account of the Votes of the Election to be laid before the King every Year: This Establishment, I say, of which I give you here a rough Draught only, but what may be improv'd every Day, and which would force the Candidates to employ their Time in improving themselves by Industry and Application, and not in making Interest to Patrons, and in purchasing

Recommendations. This so valuable an Establishment is not practicable in a Visitation, or a Demi-Visitation; because it is but too much the Interest of those Ministers to make the King Judge of the Honesty, Industry, and Merit of the Party by their Recommendation; whereas in a Polysynody, he will be able to form a Judgment himself, which makes an infinite Difference between these two Forms of Government.

ADVANTAGE XII.

Publick Spirit and Love of one's Country increas'd.

IT is incontestable, that if the Secret could once be found out of disposing of Posts, and Honours, and the other Rewards of the State, without any regard to Recommendation, but as each of the Candidates was judged well affected to the Good of his Country, as he appear'd industrious, or to have either natural or acquir'd Talents for his Employment; it would follow, that not only every one would apply himself more heartily to his Occupation; but they would in Emulation of one another, value themselves for the Love of their Country; and we should have the Pleasure to see several brave and honest Men prefer the good of the Service, or of the Publick, to their own private Interests; because the Reputation of being a good Citizen is very often of Advantage to him that acquires it. And, tho' it should not advance him to the first Posts, yet it would distinguish him among his Equals; but chiefly it would gain him the Love of all good Citizens, who would be a great

great deal more numerous, than they are at present; and such marks of Distinction would be no inconsiderable Reward of his Virtue. How advantageous this Increase of Love for one's Country would be for the King and State, is evident on the one hand; and it is but too true, on the other, that this Virtue is become very rare under the Visiership, or the Demi-Visiership. I have read an excellent Historical Character of the late Marechal de Vauban, and I could not but take notice to the utter shame of our Country and our Manners, that the Author praised him very much for the Love of his Country.

The ground of this Elogium is very real; for the crafty Courtiers having learnt by long Experience, that to please the King, to infallibly gain his Esteem, to be distinguish'd by his Favours, and to make their own Fortunes, was to declare warmly and readily for all his Enterprizes and Projects, they with Impetuosity gave in to all his Fancies, without regarding either the King's real Service, or their Country's Good.

Whereas whoever endeavour'd to stop this violent Torrent of Flattery, or to undeceive the King, and set him in the right way of Truth and Justice, run the hazard of offending him, and ruining all his Hopes and Prospects, either for himself or Family. Was not then such an Undertaking truly heroick, and what really deserves the greatest Commendations?

That prodigious number of Flatterers, who were constantly employ'd to impose upon the King, and conceal the Truth from him, was the unfortunate Effect of the Notion the King had, that it was not necessary in the disposal of Of-
fices

ices and Rewards to consult Persons of the same Profession; the most pernicious Notion that ever the Vicers could give him. Now were a Polysynody brought to Perfection, the King would in the disposal of Places and Rewards give ear to the Votes of their Equals, and this single Article by banishing from the Court an infinite number of pestilential corrupted and dangerous Persons, the Courtiers themselves might become excellent Citizens, by the Influence even of their own Interest; and to promote themselves, might labour heartily to a degree of Emulation to advance the true Interest of their King and Country. Thus the Love of one's Country would not be a Virtue so extraordinary; and will be so much the more practis'd, as it's likely to be more taken notice of, and oftner rewarded by the King himself.

ADVANTAGE XIII.

Different Degrees in the Ministry, as there are in the Army.

EVERY body sees the great Advantage that accrues to the King and State from the establishing different Ranks and Degrees among the Gentlemen of the Sword; I mean the different Posts in the Army, whether by Sea or Land. They learn the Art much better by passing thro' all these Degrees. There is a constant Emulation among those of the same Rank, to distinguish themselves by their Diligence, Application, Merit, Courage and exact Observance of Discipline; and I even think, there is not as yet a sufficient number of Degrees settled

settled among the Soldiery for so great a Kingdom, and answerable to so vast a number of Officers.

It is the hope of getting to an higher Post, that makes them surmount all the Hardships, Difficulties, and Fatigues of the Post they are in; it is by these Degrees, that the loss of a good Officer is soon repair'd, by another, perhaps, of superior Merit: It is this hope that gives them an eager Desire and Ambition to distinguish themselves, which inspires both Officers and Soldiers with that Courage, that is necessary for Conquest and Victory. Now to lessen this Hope and Prospect by Venalities, Survivorships, and Sham-Commissions and Court-Favours, is to weaken very much the chief Spring of Government.

A Colonel commands a Captain, who perhaps is richer, and of a better Family than himself, and the Captain obeys without Hesitation; the Brigadier in like manner commands the Colonel; each one obeys with Chearfulness in hopes of commanding in his turn, and the publick Service is carried on with Success. There is not an Ensign, or a Lieutenant, who may not hope to reach the elevated Post of a Marshal of France; it is the hope of being raised to this high Post, which by certain steps every one may reach, that sets all the Springs of the Machine at work, and they are weaken'd as far forth as the Sale of Places, Survivorships, and Sham-Commissions, and Court-Favour, do encroach upon Courage, Industry, Merit, and, in a word, upon the other valuable Qualities that capacitate Men for the Service of their King and Country.

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On the Post of a Marshal of France is to be fill'd up, it is easy to find a proper Person among the Lieutenant-Generals, or among the Major-Generals, of greatest Reputation. These inferior Degrees, are as it were Nurseries for a constant supply of proper Persons for the higher Posts.

All the World see and own the great Advantages that accrue to the State from the different Degrees that are settled among the Gentlemen of the Sword, and every one is ready to ask, Why the same Order should not be establish'd in a civil Ministry? What! is a good or bad Ministry of less consequence to the Glory of the King, and the Happiness of his Subjects, than the good or bad Discipline of an Army? Is not an Emulation in Honesty, Laboriousness, good Breeding, Sweetness of Temper, and Zeal for the publick Good, as serviceable in a Ministry, as an Emulation in Courage, Resolution, Patience, and exact Obedience can be of use in an Army? Nothing less. The only Reason of the difference is this, It has been the Interest of the Vissers and Demi-Vissers, who have govern'd us hitherto, to oppose so valuable an Establishment; they had not only been overlook'd in their Conduct by dangerous Overseers, and of better Families than themselves, but they had been always, under the cruel Apprehension of yielding their Places to those, that had distinguish'd themselves in the first Posts: whereas employing only obscure Persons under them, as their Subalterns, they could dismiss them upon the slightest Pretence, as soon as ever they became obnoxious.

There is no Gentleman, tho he be very easy in his Circumstances, that will refuse to be a chief

chief Secretary, or even an under Secretary to a Counsellor of State, or the Secretary or Deputy of an Intendant, &c. whenever those Places shall be look'd upon, as steps to the highest Posts in the Ministry, just as a Lieutenant's or a Captain's are esteem'd, as steps to mount to the highest Honours in the Army.

There are those among the Nobility that are qualify'd to do very well in civil Employ, who perhaps want Health or some other Qualifications necessary for the Profession of Arms. And Families would support themselves much better, if some of their Members would take to the Gown, and others to the Sword. I don't speak here of the form that might be given to so useful an Establishment, I have spoken of it in another Place: it suffices to take notice here, that this so salutary an Establishment, is absolutely impossible under a Visiership or a Demi-Visiership; whereas it is only difficult in the System of a Polysynody, and this difference can't be sufficiently valued.

ADVANTAGE XIV

The particular Offices and Allotments of Business in the Government might circulate.

THIS Notion of making the particular Provinces, or Allotments of Business in the same Council, to circulate among the Counsellors, is owing to the Regent: I read of it with pleasure in the Regulations of the Council for the Revenue. I own, that this Circulation, or Rotation, will appear of no great advantage

vantage in some cases ; in others, not easy to
 be put in practice ; and in others, where it is
 absolutely impracticable in a Polysynody : but in
 a Visiership, or Demi-Visiership, it is not prac-
 ticable in any case. Yet I shall now shew you
 several great Advantages that such a Circula-
 tion will produce. ~~There are a great many~~ There are a great many Misdemeanors of
 consequence, that the Clerks may be guilty of ;
 I don't speak of the Clerks of the Council, but
 of the Clerks or Secretaries of the Counsellors
 of State : Now these Clerks would fear to be
 detected by their Successors, and for that reason
 would refrain in a great measure from those
 Misdemeanors, especially from Misdemeanors of
 consequence, and that were punishable by the
 Law ; this Thought shews how necessary it is,
 that the Secretaries follow their Masters. Nor
 is it an invincible Obstacle ; for, to let the Suc-
 cessor with most ease into the Business, he need
 only work for some time with the chief Secre-
 taries, or Secretary, of his Predecessor, for some
 Weeks after the change, that the publick Bu-
 siness may not suffer from thence ; and this may
 be done during the Vacation allow'd to each
 Council. ~~Now may not a Successor, who is~~ ~~102~~ ~~dy.~~ Not only the Clerks themselves will be
 more careful of their Behaviour, but the Coun-
 sellors also will have a stricter eye over them ;
 for, to employ Rogues in publick Business, has
 always been esteem'd a shameful neglect, and
 a very great want of Judgment. And more-
 over, the Masters themselves, who have the
 Misfortune to employ such Clerks, have never
 been able to clear themselves to the malicious
 World, of the suspicion of having made an ad-
 vantage of these Misdemeanors, either them-
 selves

themselves or their Families, directly or by a second hand.

3^{dly}. There will not only be much fewer Faults committed by the Clerks, but their Masters also will be less careless, because there is no body but acts with more caution, not to be guilty of Faults, when he is to have a Successor that can easily find them out, and to whom he is, as it were, to give an account, than when he looks upon his Place or Province as settled and lasting.

4^{thly}. It is certain, that every one who succeeds another in a Place, will endeavour to excel his Predecessor. The best method of comparing two Men, is to employ them in the same Business; for then they soon discover their different Talents and Genius. And every body knows, that Emulation animates a Man of Merit more than the hopes of Reward.

5^{thly}. There are some Affairs of consequence, that a Counsellor of State will neglect, as long as he lives, either thro' an Aversion without reason to the sort of Business, or because he apprehends it more difficult, than it is in itself; or thro' the influence of his own Interest. Now may not a Successor, who is either less prejudiced, or is better acquainted with it, or more interested in it, or lastly is by nature more industrious, undertake it, and bring it to bear, to the advantage of the publick?

6^{thly}. Every Counsellor of State, having thus changed often, and managed for several years different sorts of Business, will be sufficiently acquainted with all the Business that can come before the Council, and will be better qualified to determine himself, and convince others, of the Resolution that should be taken in the Business.

ness before them, than if he had a less clear and distinct knowledge of the matter in debate.

7thly. It frequently happens, that opinions in Council are divided: and sometimes the Majority are for the worst side, even to the prejudice of the State. Now whence comes this diversity of Opinions? For if every one of the Voters are equally zealous for the publick Good and Justice, it is certain that this diversity of opinion cannot proceed but from an inequality of Knowledge; some seeing farther into the Business than others, because they are not all equally versed in the same sort of Business. But by means of this Circulation, or Rotation in Business, and by the particular Application each Counsellor will have, to all the sorts of Business that come before the Council; the Members by this means will have pretty near the same Experience in the same Affairs, and will of course agree in a great measure in their Notions concerning them. And thus it falls out, that a Majority will be very seldom in the wrong.

8thly. Let a regular and well methodized Mind, or a superior Genius, be practised for two years in any one Province, and he will be sufficiently instructed in all the Affairs that relate to it; and without any form'd Design, will, in his Remarks, Registers, Manner of giving Audience, and the regular Method of the Clerks, have so great an Order and Propriety in the whole Office, as never could be transmitted to a Successor by any other means. A superior Genius reduces with ease every particular Case that comes before him for his Decision, to its first Principles, and the primary Rules

Rules of judging; he sees in every case, the Cause, and Remedy of the Abuse. Is it not therefore evident, that it is much more advantageous to the State, for such a Genius of Order, Method, Principles, and Rule, who is able to shorten considerably the number and Difficulties that occur in Business, and who is able to apply Remedies to growing Abuses, to run thro' all the Courses of Business, and thus communicate his Light and Knowledge to all the different Affairs in the Council, than always to remain tied down to one sort only?

only. The Mind exerts its Force and Vigour in a new Employ, much more than if it were always engaged in the same way. A Man is oblig'd to rouse his Attention, to let himself fairly in, and to open thorowly the Principles of the new Business he is engaged in; whereas he acts generally without Attention, or at least with an unbest Mind, and only by habit, and as it were by rote, in the Management of Affairs which he is accustomed to: And who does not know, that Attention is to the Mind, what Exercise is to the Body; and that the Mind, by the renewing of the Attention, exerts its Force and Vigour, and is render'd more just by settling both the near and distant Objects in a more distinct and clearer light? Thus we see that every Counsellor of State, by coming back again, after several Years of changing, to his first Province, will be much better qualify'd to acquit himself of his Duty, to the advantage of the Publick, than if he had never changed his Employ. Let me suppose, that a Man of Parts, who has Application and Diligence, may in two years time thorowly acquaint himself with all the sorts of Business of his own Province;

thence; and that there are in the Council ten such Courses, he will be thorowly vers'd in, all the whole Business of the several Courses after twenty Years Study and Practice, as well by his own Abilities, as by the additional Light they will give him, that are to make their Reports, and give their Opinions in them: this is a Supposition that no body can dissent from. I don't deny, but, were he employ'd in the same course of Business always, he would dispatch the Affairs that came before him with greater Facility, because a Habit undoubtedly gives a Facility in acting: but I affirm, that his Mind would be more limited, and that he could never acquire so complete a Knowledge of the Relations, which the Business he had before him, had to the Affairs of different Courses. And yet it is the exact Knowledge of these Relations, which helps him to judge by more elevated Principles, and with greater security, of what may be of more or less advantage to the State. Now is it not better for the publick Interest, that a Counsellor of State can determine positively of all sorts of Business with great Exactness and Security, tho he labour with a little less Facility in any one particular Sort or Province?

10thly. There occur several Affairs of Importance, in which the Question is to find out and compare the properest Methods to the procuring certain Advantages to the State; or to find out and compare the most effectual Remedies to remove and prevent certain Mischiefs: Now is it not evident, that a Person practised in all sorts of Business, and who has had time to dive to the bottom of them, will be better qualified, both to invent the best Methods, and

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will have more Judgment to judge of the properest Remedies, than if he had been confin'd to one sort of Business only.

11thly. There are always in all Assemblies several Votes, that are dependant, or are at least not intirely free : Now these can't be made serviceable to the State, but in proportion to the Knowledge and Zeal for the publick Good he has upon whom they depend; so that, if he wants Zeal or Knowledge, these Votes that are dependant and not free, become very prejudicial to the King and Kingdom. Therefore the greater the Equality and Co-ordination of Power is, that is procur'd by a Circulation of particular Allotments in Business, the greater will the Liberty and Independance be of the Counsellors of State. There will then be more useful Oppositions, and of consequence more Knowledge and Wisdom in the Councils themselves. Is it not therefore visible, that a Circulation of the most important Parts of Business, will procure this Equality, and of Consequence create that Liberty and Independance to every one? therefore such a Circulation is very advantageous.

12thly. Some would carry this Circulation even to the Presidentship, and make that Dignity pass thro' all the Members of the same Council; and say, that as it was an Advantage to the Commonwealth of *Rome*, that the Consuls became common Senators, till they were chose a second time into the Consulship; so it would be of equal Advantage to the Kingdom, if the Presidents were reduc'd, after two or three Years, to the Condition of private Counsellors of State, till they should be chosen Presidents again: That this Method would make the Presidents more circumspect in the Use of their Authority; and

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would

would create a much greater Emulation in every body, to deserve by their Assiduity and obliging Carriage, to be set up for Presidents by their Brethren.

This would be to propose, every three Years, a considerable Prize, if I may so call it, to every Member of the Council; who, during that Interval, would labour to distinguish themselves by their Virtues, by their Talents, and by their Application to publick Business: This would be, as it were, a new Spring to increase the Motion of the Machine of State. For after all, no Undertaker is engag'd to increase the Labour of his Workmen till he has found out the Secret of giving better Wages to the best Workmen, and to him that labours most, than to him that does not work so well, and labours least. Is it not then a great Advantage to the State by this Circulation of the Presidentship, to increase the Efforts and Labours of sixty Persons of the most distinguish'd Parts, that are wholly taken up in the great and chief Functions of Government. There is moreover another great Advantage in this triennial Circulation, that a President, who is too old, and almost worn out, and whom, in consideration of his past Services, they were unwilling to turn out, will at the end of three Years naturally quit his Place to a Successor, much better qualified for present Service: This is an Article of much greater Consequence, than can be imagin'd. This Circulation of Counsellors thro' the different Provinces of Business, would be moreover of great Advantage to those that might aspire to the Presidentship; for they generally make the best Presidents, and with the greatest ease to themselves, who have on the one hand been presided over, and have had leisure to take notice of

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the Faults of their President; and on the other hand, have themselves been conversant in the different sorts of Business, which they are to propose to be debated in Council.

The same Persons, who propose, that the Presidentship should circulate among the Members of the same Council, are of Opinion, that it would be highly proper to continue the Council of Regency, under the Name of the General Council even after the Minority, and to make it up by degrees of the Persons that have been Presidents in the other Councils; provided, that they had attended for a Year at least at each of them, to be the more perfectly inform'd of all the different sorts of Business, that may come before that Council. Thus they would have these Ex-Presidents to make a whole Course of practical Politics, the better to qualify them for the Service of the State by their wise Advice in the General Council, when they shall be call'd upon to take there a lasting and permanent Seat.

Affairs of the greatest Importance, cou'd under eight different Heads, and all the several Branches of them are transacted in the General Council. Therefore it were to be wish'd, that every one of them, that may have a Seat there, might have the Convenience of informing himself thorowly, not only in Speculation, but much more by sufficient Practice of all the Subjects, upon which he must debate in that Council; otherwise he must be oblig'd to rely servilely upon the Knowledge of other People, or give his Vote, as it were by chance, and not upon Evidence and the Light of Reason.

Methtinks there are very great Advantages in this Circulation of the Presidentship, which are not found in the System of its being fix'd and settled: and in my Answers to the Objections,

I shall give some fresh Reasons, to support this System; especially, in relation to the Continuance of the Polysynody. But I don't propose this Circulation, but only as a Hint, to improve a Polysynody in general, without pretending to apply it to that of the Regency: I value what's good, but prefer what's best. I look upon the Circulation of the Presidentship to be of the greatest Consequence to the duration of a Polysynody in general; not only to rouse and increase an Emulation in the Councils, particularly when the State shall have attain'd to that degree of Perfection, by the Study and Improvement in Politicks, and by the settling of the Rule of proposing three Persons for every Employ; so always to have the chief Posts of the State fill'd with Persons that are equal, or pretty nigh equal in Parts, Merit, Application and Zeal for the publick Good. But as it may fall out, that for want of cultivating this Science, the State may be very ill furnish'd with Persons that are thorowly vers'd in Politicks, and the Rule may not perhaps be as yet settled, to compare exactly, and to know with certainty, the Degree of Merit of Persons to be employ'd; I think it would be very proper in such Circumstances, and only then, that the King should of his own Authority, continue for three Years together the good Presidents already chosen: This Exception only, respects the first Settlement of a Polysynody in a State.

In fine, tho the Circulation of the Presidentship should remain doubtful, whether it be advantageous or no, from the other eleven Advantages, which I have laid together; it follows, that a Circulation of Allotments in Business among the Members of the same Council, will upon

upon every Account be very advantageous to the State. And since this Circulation is not practicable, but in the System of a Polysynody, is it not a fresh Proof, that this Form of Government is much preferable to a Vifiership or Demi-Vifiership?

ADVANTAGE XV.

The State will suffer much less Inconvenience from the Sickness of Ministers.

IN the Government of the late Reigns, when a Minister was sick, all the Business that was under his Jurisdiction was at a Stand, and that very often was the half, or the third part, or even the whole of the Affairs of the Kingdom; and so for want of Orders in due time, all the most urgent Business was absolutely ruin'd, and the rest suffer'd very considerably. Care was always taken to conceal these Losses, but that did not make them less real: Thus the State was sick, when the Minister was so, and receiv'd every Day considerable Damage from his ill State of Health. Whereas in a Polysynody, the new Ministers or Counsellors of State are not engaged in a tenth Part of the Heap of Business that one Demi-Vifier was: when one of them falls ill, he may employ one of his Fellow-Counsellors in his Office, without running the hazard of losing his Place; and thus nothing is ruin'd, the Orders are given as usual, and the State does not fall sick, when the Minister is out of Order. It suffers no considerable Damage from thence, and a Ministry becomes in some measure unmoveable, unchangeable and immortal.

ADVANTAGE XVI.

The State will not suffer so much from the Minority, and the Decay or Dotage of Kings.

IT is certain, that Business is carry'd on with more Vigour and Life under Monarchies, than in Commonwealths, whilst the Sovereign is active, and in the Flower of his Age; because the Prince joins a strong Interest of his own, viz. the Concern for his own Reputation, and the Desire of the Subjects Happiness, to that common Motive of Interest, which makes the Ministers in Monarchies act with the same Zeal as the Ministers in Commonwealths do for the Publick. For as private Interest gives a much greater Spur to Action, it must also of Necessity give a much brisker Motion to all Business: yet it must be own'd, that this Movement is very much abated, frequently clogg'd and embarras'd during Minorities, and in the Decay and Infirmities that happen to Kings. But the Establishment of a Multitude of Councils, particularly if a pretty near Equality of Power be preserv'd amongst the Ministers by a Circulation of Business, will keep Affairs pretty much in the same Course and Motion they had, when the Health and Vigour of the Kings began first to decay. Thus the Regent has very artfully by the Invention of a Populynody, remedy'd the fatal Inconveniencies, in which Monarchies are liable from the Nature of their Sovereigns. For after any Kings, like other Men, are subject to the Infirmities of Age, or to Weaknesses either contracted or natural:

ral: But the Regent, by preserving to the Monarchical State all the Prerogatives that are proper to it, has moreover added one of the chief Excellencies of an Aristocracy; which is never to be subject either to the Confusions of a Minority, or the Weakness of old Age. Thus our aristocratical Monarchy will have very great Advantages above Commonwealths, because it will have nothing to fear, either from the Weakness or Decay of its Princes occasion'd by Age, and will be able to make Advantage of all the Strength of their Genius, of all their Labours and their Wisdom.

ADVANTAGE XVII.

The State will not suffer so much from the Credit and Interest of Women.

WERE Women educated in useful, serious, and important Studies, as the Men are; were they taught to know and desire the Good of the State; were they acquainted with the Qualities that are necessary either in a First Minister, or Chief Minister; were they capable of comparing with any Certainty the several Degrees of these Qualities in the different Persons, upon whom they are to pitch their Choice; did they know, that the grand Difference between a good and bad Government, depends upon the Difference there is between indifferent Ministers, and those that are excellent. Were they solicitous rather to procure great Advantages to the State, than by the Service of the Minister to satisfy their own Fancies, Caprice and Passions, one might very reasonably wish for

the Good of King and Kingdom, that they had a much greater Ascendant over the Mind of the King in the Choice of his Chief Ministers; but unfortunately it is far otherwise: Yet such is the Nature of Society, that it can't be avoided, but that Women will have a great Ascendant over Men according to their Art of Pleasing, as they are enterprizing, or are directed by ambitious Men; or in fine, as they have the Management and Address of making Advantage of the most favourable Moments to compass their Designs. Kings are Men, and even more prone than other Men to be govern'd by Women; because they that have all Charms of Youth and Beauty, continually strive with one another for that Government: and because no body can advance his Fortune, or even preserve it, by opposing the Prince's Will, or by making them sensible how much they act against their own Interest, when they carry their Complaisance for Women so far, as to hearken to them in the Choice they are to make, of a Chief or First Minister; and even such Remonstrances would very often be to no purpose. Thus Women choose not by the Qualifications necessary for a Minister, for they are ignorant of them, and very little solicitous about them: All they require in a Minister, as to his Qualifications, is an absolute Attachment to gratify their Ambition and Caprice. The Condition of Human Nature makes this Evil unavoidable, even without Remedy: Women will always have a very great Ascendant over Men, it is in vain to endeavour to lessen it: the best that can be done, is to strive to render their great Interest less dangerous to the State, in the Choice of those that must occupy the chief Places in it. One of the best means that

that can be found out to lessen the Mischief, which are to be apprehended from their Interest, is the Polythyody.

1stly, The Power is divided amongst so many Ministers, that the most beloved Women, who have the greatest Ascendant, will only have Power to choose some Counsellors of State; who, tho' they be bad, will have twenty times less Authority, and by Consequence will be able to do twenty times less Mischief, than a Visior, or the Demi-Visior.

2^dly, If each Council be allow'd a Power to nominate three Persons to every Vacancy, it would prevent each Council's being fill'd with Members of bad Principles, who are capable of selling their King and Country. Now if the Interest of Women could do no other Mischief, than to cause the worst of the three in Nomination to be prefer'd, the Evil could never be very great; because we may suppose the Council would never nominate others than the three best they could choose out of a Number, that would generally be Men of worth: and the Occasion of giving this Right to each Council is very proper to perpetuate in them Capacity, Honesty, and Honour; because the Regent has fill'd them up with all the choicest Men of the Kingdom.

3^dly, If the Conduct of any such Minister, who had no other Merit than the Recommendation of Women, became odious, it would be twenty times easier to remedy the Mischief, and turn him out, than to displace a Visior, or a Demi-Visior. Now is it not evident, that an Evil becomes by so much the less, by how much the easier it is to apply a Remedy to it?

4thly, I own, that the Power of Women upon every particular Counsellor of State, is to be fear'd;

funde hunc sicut nialafnooveria Vifier, or on
 vira Deu- Vifier. or. There is a wide Differ-
 ence in the Case for the Power of Women or
 of Counsellors of State, will not be formidable,
 but as much as all the Women that have such
 a Power over them, agree in the same Design,
 to say, it by a Majority of Voices, and that
 is impossible. For there is this Difference be-
 tween, publick Fancies or private Interest, and
 the Reasons and Views for the publick Good;
 because the former in different Persons are al-
 ways opposite, whereas the Reason of Things
 and the publick Good are generally the same.
 Therefore the Counsellors of State, that are go-
 vern'd by different Women, will always oppose
 one another, and the Opposition of some will
 ever prevent the bad Influences of the Authority
 of others; whereas a Vifier having no body to
 oppose him, may be engag'd by the Women that
 govern him, to do a great deal of Mischief,
 because his Word is decisive in all Affairs.

A D V A N T A G E XVII.

*A greater Security for the Continuance of
 the Royal Family upon the Throne.*

Histories are full of Revolutions, in which
 Monarchies have chang'd their Masters.
 These Revolutions have never had but two Causes;
 either the Invasion of a Foreign Power, or
 the Usurpation of a Subject, to whom the King
 had given too much Authority.

As to the first Cause, as the Monarchy is sup-
 pos'd to be govern'd by the Councils of so many
 wise and prudent Counsellors, Kings will be

much

much more inclin'd to maintain Peace, and some defensive Alliances, than to begin War; such Princes will be much more considerate in their Proceedings with their Neighbours, and more punctual in their Observance of Treaties; they will therefore have more Allies, who will be more faithful and constant to them. Now can a King of France, who has many such Allies, ever fear being dethron'd by a Neighbour, how unjust, ambitious, and powerful soever he be. On the other hand, the fewer offensive Wars he is engag'd in, the less will he be in danger of being dethron'd; particularly, if he does not suffer his neighbouring Nations to train up their Troops for many Years in War, without doing the same by his own: and here by the by I may observe, that it is much more for the Interest of a King to bring his Neighbours to Peace, than to suffer them to continue in War; and that it is much more to his Advantage to be Guarantee of a Treaty of Peace, than not to be; but this is not a proper Place to enter upon this Subject.

As to the second Cause, it is certain, that if the regal Authority be divided between two Ministers, provided that such a Division be always maintain'd equal, or pretty near equal; such a Prince will be twice as secure against the Attempts of them both, than if the whole Authority of the two were vested in one alone; because, as we suppose them equal in Authority, and opposite in Interest, it is very difficult, not to say impossible, that ever they should agree together to dethrone the King, nor place either upon the Throne. But it may be fear'd for the King's Safety, lest one of them work by degrees the other's Downfall, and raise himself upon his Ruin; and if he be of a good Family, both and

enter-

enterprising, and in Credit with the Army, he has only one Step to take from his Place of First Minister, or Mayor of the Palace, to the Throne. Now if the usurping the Crown be so difficult, by supposing only two Ministers equal in Authority; it will become absolutely impossible, when it is almost equally divided among twenty or thirty. That Jealousy alone, which will always be amongst them, is sufficient to unite them all against that Man, who would usurp the regal Authority over them, and from the King. Thus the King would always find in them quick-sighted Inspectors, who have an Interest in his Preservation against the Enterprizes of a too ambitious Subject.

The Histories of all Ages, and of all Nations, are full of such Usurpations; but without going from our own History, had the Power been always pretty near equally divided in France amongst the different Members of different Councils, the Race of *Clodoveus* had perhaps still been upon the Throne, notwithstanding the want of Merit of her lazy and unactive Kings: and is it not of the greatest Consequence to the King, to take such proper Methods now, that the third Race may not in After-ages be brought to the same fatal Period, by the same means that put an end to the first and second. The Historians tell us, that our third Race had been absolutely finish'd under Henry III. had the Duke of Guise, the then Grand Visier of France, discover'd the Order the King had given to have him assassinated, and how near he was of knowing it? which is a demonstrative Proof, that it is of the greatest Importance for the Continuance of the Royal Family upon the Throne, that the Power of the Administration be divided

as equally as possible, among a great Number of Ministers; but especially that this Power be never vested either in one single Person, or in one Family, as it was then in the Family of Guise.

ADVANTAGE XIX.

Civil Wars less to be feared, than in the Visiership.

IF a Visier be of a weak Capacity, be lazy or fearful; the Affairs of the King and State will go very ill. It is no less evident, as has been shewn already, that if he be a Man of great Genius, Application and Courage, of high Birth, and with very powerful Alliances, he will acquire great Credit both at Home and Abroad; and will thereby become very formidable to the Royal Family. Now a Man that becomes formidable is easily suspected, tho it is only from the Malice of his Enemies; and being suspected, he is often necessitated either to seize the Crown, or to lose his Life.

It is true, that if a Visier be a Man of low Birth, or a middling Family, and we have seen such, he will not be so formidable to the Royal Family, but another terrible Inconvenience will ensue; for he will infallibly for his own Preservation, remove as far as he can, all the Princes and Persons of the highest Quality from the King's Favour, and will for his own Interest represent them to him, as factious and seditious Persons of no Merit; and will be in a manner forc'd to place in the chief Places of Trust, People of low Rank, that are willing to be his Creatures and Fools. This way of Acting, which notwithstanding

standing you must allow to be natural, will infallibly cause Discontents among the Nobility, who will see with regret all the Power in the hands of one whom they despise, and the Places and Posts of Honour disposed of among his Creatures: this general Discontent, must needs unite a vast number of Malecontents against the Minister. Hence proceed Factions and Parties, and at last Civil Wars. Our Fathers had very feeling Demonstrations of the Truth of this Reasoning; for did they not see Civil Wars occasioned solely by the Discontents of the Nobility? And when Rebels get the better, the head of them of course is raised to the Throne. Whereas in a Polysynody, many of the Nobility, and particularly they of the greatest Merit and Parts, will be of the Ministry, and engag'd by Interest to support it: the rest of the Nobility either are not formidable, thro' want of Merit; or, if they have Merit, may hope to be taken in their turn; and as they will never come under any suspicion without Reason, they will never have Reason to complain of Injustice in the distribution of Favours: And thus an end will be put to all Fears of Discontent. We shall therefore be much less exposed to Civil Wars in a Polysynody, than in a Viceroyship; and is not this a very great Advantage?

ADVANCE

ADVANTAGE XX.

Foreign Wars less to be feared than under the present Government.

ALL the World knows, that the late King, in the first Discourse which he made upon his Death-bed to his present Majesty, comforted him in the strongest Terms, never to undertake War, without Reasons, that made it absolutely necessary; and he added this very edifying Expression, that he condemn'd himself mightily, because he had not always followed to good a Maxam.

He was very sensible undoubtedly, that the first offensive Wars he engaged in, without any justifiable Reason, had made him be look'd upon by all the Powers in Europe, as a Prince, who wanted a Pretence to break the Peace, who had formed Designs of aggrandizing himself at his Neighbour's Expence, and who aimed even at universal Monarchy: he was made sensible, that this Notion, which they had taken up, tho it were false, had formed too great Alliances successively against him, which had brought his Kingdom to the brink of Ruin. Now let us examine into the Causes of these first Wars; the Consequences of which have been so fatal. It was the Interest of the first Minister, who ruled during the late King's Minority, to give that Prince an Aversion to Application and Business; he therefore caused him to be educated in Idleness, and the Diversions of a Court. This Prince was naturally mild, moderate, and just; he had a much stronger bias

bias towards the Pleasures of Peace, than the Cares, Disquiets, and Dangers of War: and therefore, after the Death of Cardinal *Mar-
sine*, would have been pleased to have kept himself always upon the defensive with his Neighbours, and to have made himself the Mediator and Reconciler of their Differences; but the Minister of War, thro' a Jealousy which was natural for him to have against his Rival in favour, who managed the Treasury, and the Concerns of Trade with success, engaged the King in War, thereby to make himself necessary to his Master, and acquire a great Reputation in the State. It was moreover a sure way to bring the Minister, that managed the Revenue, into Disrepute, either by making him odious to the People, if he drew a great deal of Money from them by Taxes; or, if he did not raise enough for the successful carrying on the War, by representing him to the King, as a Minister not equal to the Trust, or as a Person not very much concerned for the Honour of his Master.

Thus the Minister, with the Assistance of the young Courtiers that besieged the King, and hop'd to raise their Fortunes by the War, contriv'd to inspire their King with a Desire of gaining a Reputation by his Arms, and of conquering upon different pretences the Provinces that lay most convenient for *France*. He laboured so assiduously, and with so much address, to make him despise his Neighbours, and incense him against them, and to make him forget that excellent as well as useful Maxim, Do nothing against your Neighbours, that you would not they should do against you, if you were in their place, and they in yours. He convinced him, that his first Attempt was so easy, and at the same

same time so glorious, that the King suffered himself to be engaged: the Minister afterwards, with so much Art, made the great Success in the first War a handle to engage him more easily in those that followed, and which immediately preceded the Peace of *Nimeguen*, which was concluded in the Year 1678. Such was the Origin, and this was the Cause of our first Wars. It was neither the true Interest of the King nor State, nor that of his own true Glory, that determined him to disturb the Repose of *Europe*; but the sole Interest and Ambition of his Minister. Had it not been for this, the King had never engaged in his first Wars, that were offensive on his side; and in all probability, he had never been forced to engage in the latter, which was offensive on the side of the Allies, and was so ruinous to his Kingdom. Now let us consider the Success of these Wars on the side of Profit and Advantage; let us cast up the Produce against the Disbursement and Expence. We have been engaged in War for thirty Years, i.e. from 1668 to this time. The King has drawn from his Subjects during these Wars, more than Fifty Millions *per Annum*, in extraordinary Subsidies, that is, one Year with another; which makes up the Sum of a Thousand Five Hundred Millions: and moreover the King owes more than a Thousand Two Hundred Millions in Rents, Wages, and Money Bills or Debentures: these Sums together, make Two thousand Seven Hundred Millions, which, at twenty seven Years Purchase, make a Hundred Millions of year Rent. The Interruptions of Trade, during these thirty Years of War, have damaged the King and State in above Fifty Millions a Year; which makes up the Sum of

Fifty Millions a Year at thirty Years Purchase. Now it is evident that all the late King's Conquests, all Charges paid, did never bring him in an eighth part of the Thousand and Fifty Millions that he paid for Interest; and yet I don't charge on the side of Expence, either the prodigious loss of Men, or the utter Ruin of the Frontier Provinces, or the irreparable Damages to the State from the immense Fortunes gained by Stock-Jobbers and Moneyed-men out of the Necessities of the King and State.

These are the glorious Advantages we have drawn from the War. Now let us consider the Wars, as they are honourable and reputable: What Reputation has the late King left behind him amongst Foreigners? Have they not thought, nay have they not publish'd it in Writing, that he was a troublesome Neighbour, without Faith or Honour, unjust and oppressive, and so much the more worthy of their Hatred, as he employed a greater Power to ruin them? I own, that the Notion *Europe* had of our late King, when they entred into the grand Alliance against him, was not just nor reasonable; yet such was their Notion, and he had unfortunately given an occasion to it; and every body must own, that our Reputation depends upon the Idea we give others of our Character. On the other hand, has he oblig'd his Subjects to regret the loss of him, by the Plenty and Happiness he preserved to them? I wish to God, for the sake of his Honour and our Happiness, he had been employed during the whole course of his Reign, in making Trade to flourish, by lessening the Difficulties that cramp it, and improving the Means that encrease it; in paying the Highways, and rendring them more safe for Tra-

Travellers; in making Rivers navigable, and reforming the Laws, to lessen the number of Law-Suits; in altering the Methods of raising the Taxes, that the People might pay less, and the publick Treasury receive more; in improving the Establishments for the Maintenance of the Poor, and the Education of Children; in encouraging Arts and Sciences in proportion to their Use and Profit; in finding out Methods to dispose of Employs and Rewards with Justice, without any regard to Recommendations; in taking away the Sale of Places, Survivorships, and Sham-Commissions; in lessening our Wants, by discouraging Games of hazard; in improving our Manners, by rendring Virtue and other useful Qualifications more honoured and respected, by being more justly and regularly rewarded.

He might easily have made himself the Arbitrator or Reconciler of *Europe*, and forced his ambitious and teachy Neighbours, to have agreed upon Mediators to end their Differences, without exposing themselves to the Miseries of War: he need only have declared against whoever should refuse to comply with the Sentence of the Arbitrator. O that he had employ'd the fifty three Years of his Reign, since he came of Age, in thus giving Peace to *Europe*! he had been the greatest Benefactor the *French* Nation ever had had; and his Name had been blessed by every Nation, nay every Mouth in Christendom. And can any one say, that the Reputation he got by his greatest Successes in War, can be compared to the Renown and Honour he would have acquired by maintaining *Europe* in Peace? And is it not evident beyond contradiction, that if, when he came of Age, and

took the Reins of Government into his own hands, he had found a Polysynody well settled in his Kingdom, he had never been engaged in the first Wars he undertook; and by consequence had never been forced to wage the last; and had by the Reputation of a wise, equitable and pacifique Prince, settled his Grandson upon the Throne of *Spain*, without setting all *Europe* in a Flame?

Therefore we may conclude, that our Kings being much less forc'd upon offensive Wars by their Counsellors of State, than by a Visier or Demi-Visier, will be engaged in much fewer unjust Wars, and by consequence will draw much fewer upon themselves from their Neighbours, and will be in less danger of being dethroned by victorious Enemies.

In fine, I have one thing to say in relation to the Minister of War, of whom I have been speaking; which is, that tho he was the first Cause, of almost all the grand Disasters that happen'd to the Kingdom since his Death, and of the great Danger we have been in, of seeing our Monarchy torn in Pieces, it is not just that he should bear all the Blame and Hatred from the Publick on that account: First, because it was impossible he should foresee all these Disasters: Secondly, because by these Conquests of the King, he hoped to make *France* more rich and powerful: Thirdly, because our Misfortunes have sprung from several Causes since: Fourthly, because had he lived twenty Years longer, he would have secured us from the greatest part of them by his Vigilance and wonderful Application: Fifthly, because after all, it is so natural for a Minister to endeavour to make himself of consequence and necessary, that
of

of fifty who had been in his Place, forty nine had acted just in the same Manner, and had committed the self same Fault. Therefore he is not so much personally to be blamed, as human Nature it self: and even several things were to be discovered in him, that shew'd a great Love of Justice and Zeal for the publick Good; so that I am convinced that all these Mischiefs did not proceed so much from the Demi-Visier, as from the Demi-Visiership.

vd These are the Inconveniences of a Visiership or a Demi-Visiership; these the Advantages of a Polysynody: Now let us see, if there are any Advantages in the former, which may not be found equally in the latter; or, if there be any, whether they be comparable to those I have been now speaking of. Let us see by what means the present Polysynody may be brought to perfection. All this shall be explained, and set in a proper light, in the Answers to the Objections.

Concerning a

POLYSYNODY

Wherein the Objections are Answered.

IT is not enough to have demonstrated the great Advantages a Polysynody has over the Visitation by positive Proofs; one ought also to clear up all the Difficulties that occur in a Subject of such consequence. And the best Method to effect this, is, in my opinion, to propose the Objections severally, and give to every one in particular a positive Answer, in such a manner, as may satisfy every fair and dispassionate Reader.

These several Objections show the Subject in different Lights, and set it in different Points

of Perspective. Men are naturally suspicious, and with reason, chiefly when any new Establishment is to be set on foot; and may well require to have cleared up, whatever may hinder absolute Conviction. Now this can never be effected to satisfaction, without showing, that which way soever the Subject turns, in whatever Light they look upon it, and whatsoever Scale they make use of, either to weigh the Advantages of its being settled, against the Advantages of its being rejected, or to compare the Inconveniences of the one, against the Inconveniences of the other; so that the result, upon such a Trial or Scrutiny, remain pretty near the same.

From whence we may conclude, that the most important part of my Work towards Conviction and absolute Persuasion, is that in which all the Difficulties are cleared and answered. I hope therefore I may be pardon'd, if I have taken care not to over-look any one, and if I have apply'd my self to clear up certain things, which the more learned and intelligent Readers may think evident enough in themselves, but which perhaps may not appear so to others: and I chuse rather to be too plain and too tedious to the few, than to be too concise and too obscure to the greater number. I have not had time to range the Objections according to the different Subjects they are upon, you have them as they were made to me, which may perhaps occasion some inconsiderable Repetitions. Slighter Carelessnesses are not improper in Subjects of Importance; on the contrary, they become them well; because the learned Reader ever supplies the Defect, and being wholly taken up with the Importance of the Subject, does

not to chuse to attend what is not of consequence; but for the manner, i. e. the Style, &c. this is the real difference between a fine Academical Performance, and a solid well reason'd Discourse of Politicks. In the former, the matter ~~the~~ is there created, is of no great account; and therefore the manner in which it is wrote, is of the greatest; whereas in a political Discourse, the Matter is of the greatest Importance, and by consequence, the Style and Manner in which it is handled, is very inconsiderable, or none at all. I don't pretend upon this Principle, that an Author ought to allow himself in gross Negligences. I only say, that it is not unbecoming him to over-look the small ones, which the Gentlemen of the Academy, who study Expression may indsed criticize; but which the Politicians, who are wholly taken up with things, are not a little proud they do not see. Most of the Objections that have been made to me, are against the Polysynody as it is settled; and not against it as it may be afterwards improved by the Regent himself. A great many Thoughts have occur'd to me, in answering these Objections, that may bring it to the desired Perfection. I have marked them with an M that the Reader may find them out. With the greater ease; they are more than fifty in number.

O B J E C T I O N I.

There was no supreme Council in the Scheme of the late Duke of Burgundy, Dauphin of France; he designed to give Attendance himself at all the particular Councils, and there to have each Affair determin'd finally, which had contributed

tributed very much to the dispatch of Business.

A N S W E R.

N. The Regent was obliged to form a Council of Regency; and tho his Office of Regent had not oblig'd him to form it, yet, methinks, it would be absolutely necessary, that such a Council should be settled in the Kingdom, to complete the System of a Polysynody; not indeed under the name of a Council of Regency, when the King comes of Age, but under that of a Supreme, or rather a General Council. I know that the late Duke of Burgundy, the Dauphin, never thought of establishing a general Council; because he framed his Scheme for himself only, who was a Prince of great Application and Knowledge in Business; and indeed such a King as he would have been, had not wanted a General Council during the Maturity and Vigour of his Age; nor would there be ever need of such a Council, were we sure to have always Kings of a settled Health and elevated Mind, and used to labour. But since Monarchies are very far from being sure of such a Blessing, and as there are a great many Kings destitute of Health or Capacity, or who have an Aversion to Labour when they come of Age, it is absolutely necessary there should be a General Council, which is not subject to old Age or Sicknes, to think and labour for them: Kings die, Kings succeed one another, Kings are very different in their Inclinations; but a Kingdom never dies. Now the only Method to prevent a Nation feeling the effects of their Laziness, want of Capacity, of their Weakness

ness for Delay thro' Age, is to provide against them by a General Council, that is understanding, full of Zeal for their King and Country, equitable, laborious, immortal, to be the Center, the Support, the Soul, and the very Band of Union to all the other Councils of State, by which the Minorities and Weaknesses in Kings are frequently compensated with in Monarchies. The fifty Years of the last Age under such Disadvantages are proof enough, and to speak the truth, 'tis a wonderful Happiness, if, in two Ages, you can find thirty Years of Government, in which the Kings have either a Capacity, or Application to Business.

4. Another Reason to prove the necessity of a General Council in these times of Weakness, is this, that it is impossible but that particular Councils must sometimes be divided amongst themselves, either about the Boundaries of their own Jurisdiction, or the Necessities of the State, or some Advantage to be procured to it. The Council of War for the Land Army with the Command a certain Fund as necessary, which the Council of the Marine will require also, as more necessary for them: Who shall judge between them? For instance, there is one yearly Fund that is set apart for certain Expenses of the State, the Council of Trade will demand it for Purposes within their own Jurisdiction, whilst the other Councils will require it for theirs: In the Concerns of private Persons of a mixt nature, one will sue in one Court, and another in another. We suppose the King, either thro' Age, want of Health, Incapacity, or Aversion to Trouble, is not in a condition to decide the Dispute; it can't therefore be determined, but by one of these two ways; either by

by a Grand-Vifler, who is vested with the whole Authority, or by a majority of Voices in a General Council: Now we have already sufficiently demonstrated the great Inconveniences of the Viflerfhip, and the Advantages of a Polyfynody; that the absolute Necessity of a General Council, in a System of Government by a multitude of Councils, is absolutely demonstrated. This was an essential Addition, that was wanting to the Plan of the Dauphin Duke of *Burgundy*: an Addition which a wise King will never be without, if not upon the account of the present necessity of it, yet at least for what may be hereafter.

5. In case the King be in condition to act, and the Affair be urgent, he may summon extraordinarily all, or some of the Members of the General Council, to the particular Council, and so decide the Affair at once. Thus likewise in the time of War, whatever belongs to Military Affairs, may be determined at the Council of War, by calling thither some Members of the General Council; thus this Council can never do him any harm, even in Affairs that require the greatest Dispatch; and may be of great use to him in Business, that will allow of more time: and what is of the greatest consequence to his Family, it will be a standing Council of Regency in case of a Minority, and an assured Barrier to secure the King and the Kingdom from a Viflerfhip: a stupid and barbarous Form of Government, ever pernicious to the Kingdom, ever very dangerous for Kings and Royal Families, as I have already demonstrated.

Nothing but new Regulations and Orders, and other Affairs of the greatest consequence, ought to be handled in the Council of Regency, or in the General Council, yet a number of others of less consequence are brought before them, and which might be decided finally in the particular Councils, especially when the Decision is carried by three to one. The President by this means, who is to make his report of it to the Council, has not time enough to set it in so clear a light, as to put the Members in a condition of judging of it with a full knowledge of the Cause; thus he, properly speaking, does nothing else but give an Account to the General Council, of what was resolved upon in the particular Council; and so his only Council in show, from which the State cannot receive no real Advantage: besides this degree of Jurisdiction draws out the transacting of Business to a great length, which is very inconvenient.

ANSWER.

N^o. 1. May not the King decree, that each particular Council shall have power to determine finally, and without him, Affairs of less consequence; as for instance, those that regard private Persons, and upon which no new Order is to be made, but the old ones to be followed. I know a Regulation must of necessity be made to determine what are Affairs of consequence, and what not; but there is nothing impossible in such a Regulation: the Court of Green-Cloth, and

and the other Courts, which are subordinate in certain cases, don't they judge without Appeal, and in the last instances in cases mentioned in the Statutes? Thus the General Council would then have the Affairs only of the greatest Importance to manage, or those that had been liable to great Debates, which would lessen the number of them very considerably; and those that are to make their Report, will have time enough to lay before the General Council all Affairs of consequence, in so ample a manner, that those who are to give their opinion, may judge of them with sufficient Knowledge; and thus it will not be a Council in shew only, but a Council of great use and advantage. Thus the greatest part of Business will be dispatch'd as readily as in the Council Departies, or in the Grand Chambre, whilst the Regent, and Council of Regency, will have leisure to attend Affairs of greater consequence.

SECTION III.

The Regent either never comes, or very seldom, to the particular Councils; and the President of each Council is obliged to give him an account of what is transacted in the Council, where he presides, and this Account is given, when he, who made the Report, and who sat at the Debate, is not present. Thus he may not only mistake in the account he gives, but also may suppress the Reasons, or alter the Facts before the Regent, without fear of being contradicted, as well as the Demi-Visiers could do under the late Reign; therefore the Resolutions may be founded upon Errors in fact now, as

much as then; therefore in this particular there is no advantage.

ANSWER.

1. The President, after having made his report to the Regent in private, does make it a second time before the Council of the Regency; where are Witnesses enough to contradict him, if he altered in the Facts.

N. 2. To avoid this Inconvenience, would it not be proper to order, that the President should never make his summary Report to the Regent, and before the Council of Regency or the General Council, but in the presence of him who made the Report at first, or before the Counsellor of the Week, who is to give his Attendance there.

OBJECTION IV.

The late King, at the recommendation of the Ministers, gave the greatest part of the Places, Benefices, Pensions, and other Rewards of the State, to their Relations and Friends. Now by the increasing the number of Ministers, are not these Recommendations increased too? and does not this give new Strength to Favour against Justice.

ANSWER.

1. All the Counsellors of State together have no more Interest in disposing of the Rewards of the State, than the Ministers had under the late King; therefore the Recommendations of Counsellors of State will not be more prejudicial

to

to the State now, than that of the Ministers was then.

N. 2. I own, it is very hard to find out a Method of disposing of the Rewards of the State, in proportion to the Service done the State; but it is far from being impossible; and I have shewn how it may be done, and I affirm it positively, because I have in another Memoir laid down the Means of avoiding the great Inconvenience of Recommendations. Now if there is any Form of Government possible, in which such a Method is practicable, it is certainly the Polysynody, where Counsellors of State will be much less concern'd in point of Interest to oppose it, than are the Vissers or Demi-Vissers, because those will have much less to lose than these, if out of Love to the general Good, they should renounce this unjustifiable and pernicious Custom of Recommendations,

O B J E C T I O N V.

By increasing the Number of Ministers, you increase the Power of Women; for after all, are not Ministers Men as well as Kings?

A N S W E R.

I. Were Kings, never to be Kings, until the Age, when Counsellors are made Counsellors of State, the Power of Women would be much less formidable than it is at present; but unfortunately both for them and for their Subjects, they are Kings very young, and in an Age when their Reason is weak, and their Passions strong; whereas in States that are but tolerably well govern'd, one never sees Ministers and Secretaries

of State, but Men of riper Years, where the Strength of the Mind is not weaken'd by too great Vivacity.

2. If every Minister decided alone in his own Province, or if all the Women that had an Ascendant over the Ministers, could carry on the same Design in every Affair, I own their Power would be very formidable, even in a Polysynody; but none of the Counsellors of State does decide absolutely on the Affairs of his Province on the one hand, because every thing is there determin'd by a Majority of Voices; and all the World knows on the other, that it is no very common thing for a great Number of Women to agree, and therefore the Power consequently upon such an Agreement is not very terrible; whereas in a Visiership, one Woman alone may turn out an incomparable good First Minister, to substitute a very bad one in his room; and yet this First Minister, as bad as he is, must alone determine every thing.

OBJECTION VI.

Should the Members of a General Council divide, who will make them agree?

ANSWER.

1. They are to be chosen among the Presidents and Expresidents of the other Councils, who themselves have been chosen by their respective Societies, as Persons of the greatest Capacities, Knowledge and Moderation; therefore one may conclude, that there are likely to be fewer Divisions among them than any where else.

2. As they will have nothing to pass thro' their Hands, and nothing to share, they can never

ver divide but in their Opinions: but a Division that a Majority of Voices always determines sovereignly, is never to be fear'd.

3. How little soever the Authority of the King, of the Regent, or of the Regency be, it will always be great enough to reconcile these Divisions, and to silence or suspend those that cause the Disturbance.

4. In a Commonwealth there is always a supreme Council; Divisions may happen amongst them, and they may form themselves into Parties, and yet we see by experience, that no such things happen, notwithstanding the constant Diversity of Opinions, either that these Divisions fall of themselves, or are not at all to be fear'd in their Consequences: And what is very remarkable, the Supreme Councils in Republicks have not the Advantage of the Authority of a Regency, Regent, or King, to calm their Disputes and Animosities.

O B J E C T I O N VII.

The Resolutions of Council will not be kept so secret as they were in the foregoing Government.

A N S W E R.

1. Secrecy in Resolutions of State is not very necessary in regard to Affairs of Government within the Kingdom: On the contrary it is very advantageous, and even absolutely necessary to publish them as soon as they are past.

2. Those that demand Secrecy for a certain time, may be treated in an extraordinary manner, wherein the Members shall be very strictly enjoyn'd Secrecy.

3. As to foreign Affairs, there are no more Members in that Council, than there were here before Ministers that were concern'd in them.

4. We don't find that the Resolutions of Republicks, either as to Affairs within their State, or those without, do fail of being kept secret when that Secrecy is necessary; nor do we find they succeed worse for want of it, than in Monarchies; and yet there are a great many more Persons that enter into their Councils: either because the necessity of that Secrecy is not so great as People think, or because many Members may easily keep a Secret, when it is their common Interest to do so.

OBJECTION VIII.

A General Council would be very advantageous to a State, could all the Members have possibly a sufficient Knowledge of all the kinds and species of Business that come before them; but that is impossible it requires more than the Life of Man to be thorowly acquainted with one Branch only: As for instance the Revenue, War, Foreign Affairs, &c. Now of what Service can the Opinions of Men be, who are not thorowly acquainted with the sort of Business that comes before them?

A N S W E R.

1. It is far from being impossible, for a Man of excellent Parts, such as all the Members of that Council are suppos'd to be, to be able to acquire a sufficient Knowledge of all the necessary Principles, Maxims and Facts, to qualify

him

him to judge of eight different sorts of Affairs, in all their different Branches, if he apply himself for six or seven years to it; either by reading the best Treatises that may be printed upon every Subject, or by Practice, or by Conference with People that are thorowly vers'd in each Branch: but tho we should suppose that two years hard Study were necessary for such Men to know thorowly what is known and demonstrated in each Kind, these Persons might have leisure more than enough for their Purpose; because it may be a standing Rule, that none shall have a Seat in this Council before the Age of forty five; and after they have presided in some other Council, and given their Attendance to all the rest: and moreover, for the future, they will have a Convenience even from twenty Years old, of applying themselves to all the different Degrees or Branches in Business, by being supply'd with a sufficient Number of excellent Memoirs, which the Council for the Improvement of Politicks will cause to be printed.

2. The Art of Physick, for instance, has as many Branches either in Practice or Theory, as there can possibly be in Politicks; and yet any Man of sound Parts and great Application may, by that time he is twenty six or twenty seven Years old, thorowly acquaint himself with whatever is known and demonstrated in this Science: and who doubts, but that he is capable at that Age of making new Discoveries himself, and passing a sound Judgment upon those already made? Will not he that studies Politicks from eighteen or twenty have the same Conveniencies of improving himself, as he that applies himself to Physick? He must therefore be qualify'd by twenty six or twenty seven to judge of all the sort of

Business, by the Methods I have prescrib'd in my Treatise of *The Improvement of Politicks*. Now if he continues eighteen or nineteen Years more in the under or higher Posts of Government, for instance, if he be an Under-Deputy, or a Secretary-General of a Government, or a Comptroller, a Member of some Council, President of the same, and an Assistant at the other Councils; can it be said, that a Man so qualify'd by Nature and Practice, who has been chosen by his Equals from among the best to fill these different Employ's, is not at forty-five Years old sufficiently enter'd into, and well enough form'd to judge of all the sorts of Business that can come before the General Council.

OBJECTION IX.

It often happens that Orders are to be made, and Affairs that belong to many Councils to be decided between private Persons; each Council will claim and will have right to claim them, and in the mean time Business will remain undetermin'd. This Partition of Business to different Councils can never be done with so much exactness, but there will occur a great many Affairs of that mixt Nature; whereas the Determination of Affairs under the Visiership, was not liable to this Inconvenience, because the Authority was not divided among so many Members, but united under one Head, and knew not what Affairs of a mixt Nature meant.

ANSWER.

If two Councils claim the same Cause, the King or General Council may easily determine to

to what Court it belongs; if there is no such Claim made, nothing will hinder the Determination: Upon this Account therefore the Visiership has no Advantage over the Polysynody; and on the other there are a great many invaluable Advantages that a Polysynody has over a Visiership, as has been seen already.

OBJECTION X.

The Number of Members will expose every Council to Disputes about Authority, to Factions and Divisions, which are prejudicial to Business.

ANSWER.

It is much more common for Animosities between Demi-Visiers to be prejudicial to publick Business; as we have found but too much by Experience.

2. The Councils in Commonwealths are subject to the same Inconveniencies, and yet they support and maintain themselves with as much Order and as great Steadiness as Monarchies of the same Extent can do. We must conclude then, that the Evils caus'd by these Divisions and Animosities, are neither very frequent nor very considerable.

3. There is this Advantage in Monarchies above commonwealths, that the King, the Regent, or the General Council, may easily pacify these Divisions, when prejudicial to Business; for they are very far from being so, but are very useful, when they raise a greater Emulation in the several Members to discharge their Duty with more exactness.

4. These Divisions among private Members may be of singular Use to the Sovereign, inasmuch as they will produce more Application and Industry in the Service of the Publick than any other thing whatever. They need only be restrain'd by certain Laws, which will rather increase than weaken them, and will direct their Force and Vigour to the Good of the State, and to make Decisions by a Plurality of Voices more esteem'd. To be forc'd to yield to the greater Number is a plain way indeed, but the only one, and most wonderfully effectual to maintain Peace and Union in Bodies, whose Members are inclin'd to quarrel, and by consequence to procure them that Knowledge, Strength, and Happiness by their Union, which they can never have without it.

O B J E C T I O N XI.

A Council to regulate Affairs within the Kingdom seems to be very unnecessary, because the others include all sort of Business, as the Revenue, Trade, War by Land, Marine, Foreign Affairs and Religion, nothing therefore can be turn'd over to them, but the loose Business of every Council.

A N S W E R.

N. Why should not the Examination of Political Memoirs to facilitate the Method of making new Regulations and Establishments belong to the Office of this Council. In my Treatise of the *Improvement of Politicks*, I have shewn the great Advantages such a well regulated Office would procure to the State, therefore such a Council may

may be made of infinite Advantage to the Kingdom.

OBJECTION XII.

I own, say they, that such a Form of Government will be very useful to the State, when the King loves Business, and is frequently present at these Councils to inform himself and see things with his own Eyes, and in their Origin; but when the Prince is weak in Capacity, averse to Business, or immers'd in Pleasures, it is better for him to have one First Minister, in whom his whole Power is vested, because Corruption soon creeps into those Councils, and the Contest is who shall get most Money at the Expence of the Publick: and 'tis better for a Kingdom to have only one Man to gorge with Riches than 60.

ANSWER.

1. As it is agreed, that this Form of Government is most proper for understanding and industrious Princes, who love to know every thing to the bottom, this is very happily our own Case; one may say, that the Regent could never have settled a Form of Government more proper for him self: And on the other hand we have already shewn, that he could not possibly have pitch'd upon one more advantageous to the Kingdom.

2. A Prince of a weak Constitution, and heavy Mind, one that is lazy and unactive, and abandon'd to Pleasure, will have more Credit in the State, and Reputation among Foreigners, by maintaining and establishing a Polysynody, and by equally dividing his Authority among the Members of several Councils, than by throwing

all his Authority upon one Man : because all the Credit of the Success will naturally light upon the first Minister, when there is but one; whereas it will be divided among so many Members in the other Case, that it will come almost intire to the King; much after the same manner as in the gaining a Battle or the Success of a Campaign, the Valour and Conduct of the Soldiers, and subaltern Officers, redound to the Profit and Glory of the General. *Lewis XIII* a Child dear to *France*, had a very ill Education, they never us'd him to conquer the Difficulties of Labour; thus finding himself much inferior to those, who by Habit had made Labour easy to them, the only thing he had to do was, whilst he gave himself to Diversions and Amusements, to choose one upon whom he might throw the Care of the whole Government; and it was better for him, who had so utter an Aversion to Labour and Business, to trust his whole Authority with one single Minister, than to divide it amongst three or four, who would for ever be drawing him to his Opinion. And of all the Persons he could chuse for that Place, I believe the Cardinal *de Richelieu* was, all things consider'd, either the best, or one of the best he could find; but it is certain, had a Polysynody, in that degree of Perfection it may be easily brought to, been then establish'd, he might have exempted himself from all Application to Business equally, and yet have govern'd with more Tranquillity, and with as great Success, and a great deal more Reputation, than he did by the Form of Government he chose by a single Visier. I say with more Reputation, and for Proof of this I bring this one Fact. *Grotius*, then Ambassador from *Sweden*, went frequently to wait upon the

the Cardinal *de Richelieu*, and they took notice that he almost never went to wait upon the King; and being ask'd the reason, he answer'd, *Qui regit hic Rex est*; He that rules is King: which is a very sensible Proof, that all the Glory of the Administration rests upon him, who governs when he is alone.

3. In regard to Riches a First Minister may take Bribes, may sell Places, Pardons, and even Justice it self; he may also with Impunity enrich himself by many other shameful and unlawful ways, because he is the Master, and has no Check, and fears no censure, he may get an immense Estate at the Expence of the Publick; but the Case is quite different in the Counsellors of State, if any of them be corrupted and vicious Men, they are all under the Observation of their Competitors, who are very severe Censors, and the Fear of being discover'd and disgrac'd, will always be sufficient to restrain them: the shameful ways then of growing rich are absolutely impracticable to them, particularly if a circulation of Allotments be set on foot.

OBJECTION XIII.

A First Minister dispatches more Business in ten or twelve Hours, than seven or eight Councils can do; therefore a Visiership is preferable to a Polyfynody.

ANSWER.

1. Provided that in a Polyfynody there are no urgent Affairs to be decided, but what are finish'd in time; and that the Councils have moreover sufficient time to dispatch the less urgent Business

Business without any Delays that are prejudicial to the Government, the King and Kingdom have all the Advantages of a Visierhip, and avoid all the great Inconveniences of it. Now it is certain, that all these Councils, that set every day from Morning till Night, either in a Body with the King, or in Committees at home, and at the Presidents, may easily decide and dispatch all Business that comes before them in time; therefore upon this account the Visierhip has no advantage over a multitude of Councils.

2. We see that all Affairs in Commonwealths are determin'd and dispatch'd in time in the different Councils, without any Delays that are prejudicial to the State, with so great expedition, that a grand Visier cannot dispatch them sooner. Why then should not a Polysynody in a Monarchy dispatch them as readily, as that of a Republick?

3. There is a great Quantity of small Business by retail, as the Answers to Letters, issuing out Orders and Warrants, where settled Rules are to be follow'd. Now the President of each Council may dispatch these by himself, when he has the Rule in Writing, and about which he is not obliged to consult either King or Council; and thus by consequence he does the same a first Minister would do. Is it not evident, therefore, that fifty Men, with sufficient Authority, will turn off more of this sort of Business of small consequence, than one Man can do; and yet this is above two thirds of the Business of each Council.

4. It is true, it would be proper, that each Counsellor of State should, by positive Declaration, have all the Cases, which he either could or ought to decide upon the spot, and provisionally

sionally determine, till he could lay them before the Council: Are such Declarations impossible to be given in the Instructions of the Counsellors in each Allotment of Business, and the Resolutions of the Council it self? So that a Counsellor of State will have full Authority in many smaller matters that happen every day, and determine in them like a first Minister, without speaking to the Council; also the particular Council will be vested with an absolute Authority in the more important Affairs, tho' not of consequence to be laid before the King, the Regent, or the General Council. Among all the Affairs each Member must bring before the Council, there would not one half be even brought before them, if each Council every year would publish some general Orders and Statutes, as Rules of judging in the like Cases, or pretty near alike to those they had before them, the year foregoing: thus each Officer in the Provinces, by these Orders and Judgments in different Cases, would be instructed to know what was his own Duty, and what another's, what was his own Right, and what another's, which would decrease by more than one half the number of Disputes and Difficulties, which come every day before the Council for a Determination: Now such Orders and Statutes, which may lessen the Quantity of Business in each Council, are no ways impossible to be made: It is evident then, that they having less Business to transact, will give a greater dispatch to it, and yet with a fuller Examination. I know very well, that there are some Affairs, particularly in time of War, that require to be decided and dispatched with greater Expedition than others; but nothing is easier to be

be effected than this. As the multiplying of Wheels gives a greater Force and Exactness to Motion in a Machine, tho' it makes it go slower, so it is easy to take away some of the Wheels, and cause the chief Springs to work more immediately, and without hindrance; and then the Machine will work with a sufficient quickness in Motion; and the sense of the publick Interest being rendered, by general Disasters, more active in each Man, will direct every one, in spite of his private Interest, to act more directly and steadily for the common good. The *Romans*, thro' a dread of Regal Government (that is to say, of a Form of Administration, in which, for want of a Polysynody, Power is frequently abused) sometimes threw the whole Authority of the State upon one Man, to dispose of all the Forces of the Commonwealth as he thought fit, whilst the storm lasted: Now a King, being a Dictator by Birth, nothing can hinder him from using what Expedition he pleases, in Affairs where it is necessary.

N. 6. If ever any one of our Kings could be engag'd, to get the fundamental Treaty of Polity among Sovereign States to be sign'd, which was heretofore propos'd by *Henry IV.* to make Foreign and Domestick Wars impossible, and Peace unalterable, these tempestuous Ruffles in Bodies Politick were not to be feared; nothing would endanger them, and there would be time enough to remedy all the common Evils with sufficient dispatch, without having recourse for a time limited, to the Power of a Visier or a Dictator: and I have demonstrated in another place, that it is possible for the Regent himself to bring about the signing such a fundamental Treaty.

7. Except in time of War, it is not of importance, how many Decisions can be made in a day; but what is of greatest consequence is, the advantage of each Decision to the King or Subject; this is the grand Point. Does not this great Advantage, *viz.* to have always in view in each Decision, rather the publick Good than private Interest, depend entirely upon the greater Qualifications of the Mind, and Rectitude of the Heart in each Man? Now can it be imagin'd, on the one hand, that one Man has more Knowledge than thirty, who are equal to him in Abilities? And may we not believe, on the other, that this grand Visier, if he is not that Man who was never yet to be found, will, in his ordinary Decisions, rather follow the Impressions of his private Interest, than be guided by the Advantage he may procure to the King and Kingdom, whilst he may thus prevaricate with Impunity? Thus the more Decisions he makes in a day, the worse it will be for the State. I own, that a Man may sacrifice for some time his private Interests, Pleasures, Time, Freedom, Passions, Resentments, and Suspicions, to the Interest of his King and the Publick; to settle his Reputation of being disinterested, to get Renown, and to establish and fortify himself in his Post. But when he has once gain'd his Point, you will see him degenerate into a common Creature; for as it is natural to an ambitious Man, to sacrifice a great deal to get into the highest Place, so it is as natural for him to exempt himself from all these troublesome Sacrifices, when he is once got there, and thinks himself sufficiently secured in it?

But, you will say, cannot a Man be found so enamour'd of Glory and solid Reputation, as

to

to sacrifice to it, for his whole Life, all his other Passions and Pleasures? Is not there a first Minister to be found of so sublime a Genius, a Man so active, temperate, and laborious, not puffed up with Vanity or irregular Ambition, no Slave to Covetousness and Revenge, exempt from the Passion of raising his Family, and favouring his Relations and Friends, without a taste for Pleasure, or fear of losing his Place, doing always justice to Merit, without exception of Persons, and free from Partiality either to Relations or old Friends? I answer, that to find such a Man would be the greatest Miracle: But in choosing a Form of Government, ought one to pitch upon that, which, without a Miracle, must needs be very pernicious both to the King and to our selves?

8. Tho' by Miracle such an excellent Visier might be had for a time, could not a Favourite, or a Mistress, choose a Successor, who in three or four Years, might overturn and destroy what the other had been erecting with indefatigable Pains and Labour, for thirty or forty Years before? A new Visier, new Maxims; therefore the Visiership is much more unsettled in following good Maxims, than Councils that subsist always.

9. When a State is governed by a grand Visier in all Affairs, there are three Interests to be brought to agree; the Visier's, the King's, and the Subject's: Now, who can imagine but that the Visier will almost always prefer his own, when he can do it with Impunity? and that he will not take one Step towards the King's Interests, and the Subject's, but only as far forth as he can accommodate them to his own? But the case is different in an Aristocracical Monarchical

Monarchical Government, i. e. a Polysynody; for as the Counsellors of State are continually watch'd by their Competitors, they can never prefer their own Interest to the Publick's, with Impunity; and therefore they have only two Interests to reconcile, viz. those of a wise King with his Subjects; than which nothing is more easy.

so The King and Kingdom have, as I have said, two considerable Advantages in erecting of Councils. The first is, that the Counsellors of State altogether, have more Knowledge than every one of them has alone, since they are all of the same Rank; and the whole is more valuable than a part. The second is, that going altogether, and observing one another, they are more firm and steady in their Decisions in relation to the great end of Government, which is the Good of the State, than a first Minister can possibly be: And I have already given the Reason, which is, that the private Interests of their own Reputations necessarily determine them towards the publick Good, when they act in Company; whereas, perhaps, there would not be one of them, if made Grand-Vizier, and well settled in his Place, who would not by acting separately, and without any dependance upon the Will of others, and by having no Companion to be witness of his Conduct, and by being in no need of the Opinion of any Man, very often neglect the Interest of the State, i. e. of the King and of the Subject, to follow his own private Interest. And this is the great difference between him that acts without witness, and him that acts in Company: because the latter is oblig'd to act for his Companions, as his Companions are forc'd to act for him; and

and thus they all act jointly for the common Interest. Now, to have found out the secret to make Ministers act with Zeal and Constancy, and thro' the Influence of Self-Love for the common Good, is, I am sure, to have attain'd to the sublimest part of Politicks, than which, of all human Sciences, nothing is more sublime and conducive to the Good of Mankind.

11. One can't expect that a great Machine, compos'd of so many Wheels, can possibly have at first all the Quickness and Facility of Motion that it may have by the help of Observation, which in many years will be made, by those who have the direction of it, and are to regulate its Motions.

12. They who have the honour to attend the Councils, and have a nearer view than I can possibly have, of the Nature and Origin of the Business that is directed there, and of the Rules they are managed by, will be better able than any body else, to propose in Abstracts the Notions that shall occur to them, either to lessen the Quantity of Business by new Regulations, or give them a greater Dispatch, with more justice to private Persons, and advantage to the State. N. Thus I should think it proper, that in the beginning of each year, the King should require every one to deliver in a Writing of two or three Sheets at most, and sealed, in which they should give their Thoughts of the Methods requisite to improve their Councils. These Papers should be open'd, and examin'd by the General Council; if any one had nothing to offer towards this Improvement, he should be oblig'd to declare it in his Writing, which would be a sort of Shame, that he contributed nothing to the common Treasury, whilst

whilst others did. There are, 'tis true, a great many wise Men, who, thro' too great a Modesty, would never propose any useful Project; but would do it, when oblig'd in obedience to an Order, and out of Duty. And this Regulation once put in practice, would have this good effect, that the same Notion, being offer'd by a great number of Counsellors of State, would acquire a much greater Authority, and would be almost sufficient to determine the forming a useful Regulation from that alone.

O B J E C T I O N XIV.

A Man of a superior Genius, may have some very good Projects, which he would put in execution for the advantage of the State, if he were first Minister, but otherwise will not so much as mention them, for fear of the Opposition of his Companions, either for want of Knowledge, or thro' Envy.

A N S W E R.

1. There are a great many fine Projects, which are neither useful in themselves, nor practicable; but, if they are really so, and the Author will give himself the trouble, with Temper and Moderation, to demonstrate, that they are both feasible and advantageous, and his Companions be Men of superior Genius, as well as he, he need apprehend nothing from their Opposition, and tho he does not succeed at one time; he may infallibly at another; for Truth makes its own way at last, and always gains the better.

2. If these Projects are only advantageous in appearance, if they are not practicable, if the

Charge to bring them to bear is greater than the Profit that will arise from them, if in the bottom they are pernicious, it is a very great advantage to the State, that such a Counsellor is not a grand Visier, and that his Projects may be contradicted and opposed in the particular Council, of which he is a Member: for fine Projects are good ones often in appearance only.

N. 3. By the establishment of a Council for the examination of political Memoirs, especially if it be brought to perfection, for the improving of Politicks, according to the Methods which I have laid in my Treatise upon that Subject; whosoever shall propose any thing that may be advantageous to the State, shall not only meet with no opposition from that Council, but on the contrary, shall find all the Countenance and Favour he can desire; and whatsoever shall be proposed that is advantageous, will be executed as soon as other Projects of greater Importance, and that require more dispatch, will allow; and therefore on this account, a Polysynody has the same Conveniences of a Visiership, and none of the Inconveniences.

OBJECTION XV.

You suppose that the Members of these Councils may in time become equal to one another in Capacity, and as great Ministers of State as ever the Cardinal *de Richelieu* was; which is very far from being true.

ANSWER.

We ought not to form wrong Notions of the Vastness of Cardinal *de Richelieu*'s Genius, nor
of

of his great Abilities, nor Skill in Politicks; for I think Justice enough will be done his Merit, if you allow him to be a Genius of the first rank. Politicks are a Science in which one may excel, First, by a penetration of Mind to unfold and disintangle intricate Affairs. Secondly, by an extent of Knowledge in taking in and comparing a great many Objects, with their relations, at once. Thirdly, by an exactness of Judgment, to distinguish nicely, and with ease, a good Argument from a bad one, and the Proportion or Disproportion of Means to an end. Now I don't see any thing that Cardinal *de Richelieu* either did, or wrote in Politicks, or upon other Subjects, that might not have been written, or done, by any Genius of the first Rank; I don't see any thing that proves him, in Penetration of Mind, Extent of Knowledge, or Soundness of Judgment, to have been the only one of his Rank; and that a hundred Genius's which were as great, clear-sighted, judicious, in a word, of equal Merit in all respects, who would have wrote and thought as deeply as he upon the same Subjects, had they been practised in them as long as he, and had the same Opportunities of improving themselves by Practice as he had, might not be found in *France* among the Gentlemen of the Sword, and of the Gown, amongst the Clergy, and even in the Ministry it self. He had the Vanity to contend with the best Poets of the Age in Dramatick Knowledge, and with the best Divines in Controversy; and he was very far from shewing any great superiority in them; because he had applied himself much less to those Studies than they had. He would have met with the same Fate had he contended with *Descartes* in Phy-

sicks and Geometry; he had employ'd his Thoughts less upon those Matters, than that great Philosopher had done, who was his Contemporary. Great Abilities require not only the Happiness of having the Organs well disposed by Birth, and a good Education from the beginning of Life; but also reading of the best Authors upon the Subject of one's Studies, deep Meditation upon what has been read, and frequent Conferences with those that are engaged in the same Study: Now the Qualifications of Birth being supposed equal, Exercise, and that constant, with the best makes a Man rise to the First Rank, whilst another, who had not equal Advantages, remains in the Second; and that one may be full as well qualified at thirty, as another shall be at fifty. And were one to settle Classes of Men of good Understanding, I mean by them, Understandings that are superior to the common rate of Men, it may be said, there are those, who for want of a natural Genius, will never be able to raise themselves beyond the third Class, by the greatest Application, and most constant Exercise. Secondly, They who at present are at the head of publick Affairs, have this advantage over the Cardinal *de Richelieu*, that they may make advantage of his Writings, and those of the few Authors in Politicks that have wrote since him. Thus our Counsellors of State, tho they should be inferior to that First Minister in natural Genius, they would be at least equal to him in their knowledge of Politicks, by reason of the Progress they have made in that Science, with the help of his Discoveries, and the Discoveries that have been made since. There are at this time a hundred natural Philosophers, and

and Geometricians in *France*, who, tho they be much inferior to the great *Descartes* in Genius, are far superior to him in the Knowledge of natural Philosophy and Geometry, tho he was by far the greatest and most accomplished Man in his time in those Sciences, because they have the advantage of his Knowledge, and of his Disciples.

Thirdly, If Politicks in *France* make as great a Progress within twenty or thirty Years, as it is possible they may; and if the Methods I have laid down in another Treatise, to judge of the Capacity and Judgment of the Persons that shall apply themselves to that Study, be put in practice, it will be easy to employ none in the Council, but Men of the first Class and Rank. And if the measures taking for the Improvement of this Science be brought to perfection, it is certain, that they who shall enter upon publick Business, will be more knowing, than they who are now employ'd; and that our Councils will be then filled with Persons of an equal Genius to, and much more expert in, all the parts of Politicks, than ever was the great Cardinal *de Richelieu* seventy six Years ago; and this is what was to be proved.

OBJECTION XVI.

The Cardinal *de Richelieu* did more for *France*, than sixty Men of equal Abilities with him could have done, if divided into different Councils; each of which would have had only the Co-partnership of his Authority, because they would always oppose one another.

G 3 ANSWER.

A N S W E R.

You must distinguish between debating and executing of Business. True it is, that till the Council is come to a Resolution by a majority Voices, there will be great differences in opinion; but the thing being once resolv'd upon and determin'd, there is no opposition in the execution of it: and as Contradiction gives Light and Knowledge, were a Council form'd of ten Cardinals *de Richelieu*, they would not so often err in their Resolutions, as some of them would, if no body should oppose him.

N. 2. I have already said, that it would be the Business of the Council, for the examination of Political Memoirs, to support all advantageous Proposals.

N. 3. When there are great Contests in Councils, it is an Argument they are compos'd of Persons very different in Knowledge and Capacity: but if we suppose they will in time be chosen by their Equals from among Genius's of the first Class, and those that shall be the most zealous for the publick Good, it is impossible there should be so many Contests; but on the contrary, there must be the greatest Uniformity of Opinion, as the effect of their Equality in their Knowledge and Capacity.

O B J E C T I O N XVII.

A First Minister has all the Honour of the Success of his Undertakings, which is to him a greater Encouragement than the Members of different Councils can possibly have; for, the Honour being divided amongst so many, it can
never

never be a Motive powerful enough to make them surmount all Difficulties, that very often require the greatest efforts of Mind and Resolution to overcome.

A N S W E R.

First, It is indifferent to the State, provided the thing be maturely examin'd, whether one Man reaps all the Honour, or it be divided amongst many : and I have already demonstrated, that by establishing a Council for the improving of Politicks, every Proposition that is advantageous, would be approv'd, receiv'd, and executed.

Secondly, A First Minister may, as we have said, undertake a thing thro' Ignorance, that in the whole will prove very disadvantageous to the State : and is it not evident, that the Council for the Improvement of Politicks, and other Councils, being incomparably better qualified than one Man, will be very much less subject to commit such Faults.

Thirdly, A First Minister might reject a very advantageous Project, and execute another that was incomparably less so, because he was the Contriver of it : But in a Polysynody, the State will not be exposed to these Inconveniences ; for the Projects that are of greatest consequence, and require dispatch, will always have the preference of those that are neither.

Fourthly, I can't see that a Counsellor of State should not be excited by the Honour of the thing it self, to set a glorious Project on foot ; for tho it must be rectified, and put in execution by the Assistance and Authority of others, he alone will reap all the Glory of the Success.

Success. N. And herein the great Motive of Glory is preserved in its full Vigour, to excite fifty or sixty Men of equal Capacity with the Visier, to undertake any extraordinary things; and as to ordinary Business, we have already shown, that an Emulation will be kept up amongst the Members, by a Circulation of Allotments of Business in the several Councils: Is not this Motive then sufficient to make them labour without intermission, with Zeal and in Emulation of one another? Thus a Polysynody, even in this, has the same Advantage of a Visiership, and none of its Inconveniences.

O B J E C T I O N XVIII.

One general uniform Scheme of Government must regulate all Affairs, Undertakings, and particular Negotiations: Now in a Polysynody, every Counsellor has his own Scheme, and this Diversity must produce Decisions, that contradict one another, and create great Confusion in the grand Movements of the Machine of Government.

A N S W E R.

First, The Counsellors in the Government have no such general Schemes, that are opposite to one another. There are eight general heads, that include all Affairs relating to Government, to wit, the Administration of Justice, Polity, publick Revenues, War, Marine, Trade, Foreign Affairs, and Religion: can there be any other general Scheme, than to make Regulations and Orders, in regard to these eight general heads, the most perfect that can be, and to find out

out ways and means to bring them to that perfection in a short time? The Counsellors therefore can be of different Opinions from one another only in the choice of the Means to compass this: Is it not then past dispute, that more Knowledge is to be found in an Assembly of ten Men equally knowing, than in the head of one of the ten? therefore every Council will be seldomer in the wrong, than one of its Members; therefore every Council will chuse most commonly the best side; therefore the Decision of private Affairs will always have a greater relation to and connexion with the general Scheme: for the Decision of Counsellors can never be thought to have a nearer relation to the general Scheme of good Government, than when in every particular Business the best Methods are most constantly, and most steadily followed, in regard to the general Good of the State: for in truth, is not that the best general Scheme of Government, which in every particular Affair tends directly to the greatest Advantage of the State? I am not ignorant, that Occasions offer, in which the Improvement of one particular sort of Affairs, ought to take place of the Improvement of those of another sort, as for instance, the great Encouragements of military Affairs are to be sometimes preferred to the greater Encouragements of Trade: Now is it not evident, that when the matter in debate before the Council shall be which should have the preference, that the Resolutions then taken will always be more agreeable to the best general Scheme, that is, the greatest Good of the State, than if they depended upon the Advice of any one of its Members, who would have no more Knowledge than any of the other

Members,

Members, and who would always have more regard to his own Interest than the Publick, *2dly*. If unfortunately a First Minister takes the worst Courses to bring any one of the general Heads to Perfection, it is much more difficult to make him alter his Scheme than make a Council do it, that should be led into a Mistake by the Minority, because very few dare contradict a Visier, or lay before him Reasons contrary to his Opinion; or if they dare alledge Reasons that are convincing, they do it in too weak a manner, and he thro' Obstinacy or Point of Honour resists these Reasons; whereas in a Council where all the Members are Equals, and there is no Dependance upon one another, and where there is more or less Envy, the Argument is supported with Vigour; and the side of Reason, after it has been foil'd for want of sufficient Knowledge to support it, gets the better by means of some new Trial, or some Reflections upon what has formerly happen'd. Could you indeed give us sufficient Security, that a First Minister will always be infallible as to his Knowledge, and above Reproach as to his private Interest; and that all his Successors will always be like him, then we shall be sure that their Decisions will agree perfectly with the general Scheme, and that this Scheme will always be the best. But as such a Security can never be given, is it not plain that a Polysynody ought to be preferr'd; that is, that Form of Government where the greatest Knowledge is to be found, and the evil Influence of private Interest least to be fear'd.

OBJECTION XIX.

The Man of great Parts and Capacity has but his Vote in these Councils, no more than he of a middling Capacity ; therefore he is no more serviceable to the Publick than the other : whereas were he First or Chief Minister, he would be in a Condition of rendring much greater Service to his King and Country.

A N S W E R.

1. I own that such a Person has but his own single Vote ; but then by his Parts and Capacity he may bring others over to his Opinion : and thus by them may always be more serviceable to the State, than a middling Genius is able to be.

2. A Man of great Parts and Capacity is soon found out in these Societies by his Fellow-Members, who not only have a greater Deference to his Judgment, but also will sooner chuse him President than another, if the Presidentship circulates by the Election. N. Thus he finds in his Society an Authority equal to his Merits, and renders Services to the State in proportion to his Talents.

3. Cicero had but one single Vote in all Debates of the Senate, no more than the most ignorant Senator there ; but by the Greatness of his Parts, and even by the Authority which they had procur'd him, he carry'd a great many Voices. Thus he was much more serviceable to his Country by his great Genius, than another Senator of more indifferent Qualifications.

4. The Authority of a Visier of superior Merit is dangerous, because it is often employ'd
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for private Interest against the Government ; whereas the Power of Persuasion which is solely founded in the Strength of Reason can never but be advantageous.

5. The Objection supposes a great Superiority of Genius in the Person, as compar'd to his Colleagues ; but if the Secret can be found out of placing for the future in these Councils, none but Men of the greatest Parts in the Kingdom, they will all be of the same Class, and of Consequence pretty near alike : Thus the Objection grounded upon this great Inequality falls to the Ground. And it has been shewn in another place, that this Secret may be possibly found out.

O B J E C T I O N XX.

The great Estates which our first, or at least our chief Ministers made, were noble Objects for their Pursuit, and great Motives of Emulation ; whereas in a Polysynody no body can expect to make but middling Fortunes. If you weaken the Motives that are the great Springs to Action and Industry, you weaken Industry it self.

A N S W E R.

1. The Word *GREAT* is a relative Term, the Increase of ten or twenty thousand Livres a Year may be a sufficient Recompence for a great Number of Men of Merit and Parts that have but very small Fortunes ; their Salaries also may double their Revenues. Now an Increase of twice as much as a Man has, may be well look'd upon by every body as a considerable Reward.

2. It is true, such an increase of Estate will be very inconsiderable to those that are worth

an

an hundred thousand Livres a Year; but Men of that Bulk are not generally very industrious, and if they cannot be excited to serve their Country by the Motive of Honour, the State will be no great loser by being depriv'd of their Labours in the Ministry on the one hand, whilst it will be a great Gainer on the other, by getting into its Service a great Number of very industrious Persons of the greatest Parts, which it may more easily find amongst the poorer Gentry than amongst the rich; because there are a great many more of the former than of the latter.

3. Men of large Souls and elevated Minds, don't look so much upon the increase of Wealth, as upon the Means of acquiring Honour and Reputation, by being more serviceable to the Publick than others, as what is most desirable in Employments and Business.

4. The Respect, Distinction, and Character which Places in Council give a Man, are a sort of good that Riches never give. This is so true, that were it not for this Motive, Men of large Circumstances would never, as they do every Day, purchase at a high Rate Places that give a Seat in Parliament, or in the lower Courts of Justice, or in particular Courts, whose Salaries are very small, but are considerable for the Rank they give them in the World. The great Pensionary of *Holland* has only a hundred thousand Florins a Year Salary from the State; and yet this Place is passionately desir'd by a great many great Men in that Republick, either thro' Motives of Glory, or for the Rank and Distinction it sets them

in. It is true, such an increase of Estate will be very inconsiderable to those that are worth

O B J E C T I O N XXI.

If you suppose the King to sit sometimes in the particular Councils to hasten the Dispatch of Business, there will not be time to read Memorials at length; and therefore they must of necessity come back to the Custom of making Abstracts.

A N S W E R.

1. As the King will never assist at these Councils, but when Affairs are of so great Consequence, or so urgent as not to admit of the Delay of carrying them to the General Council, there will be time enough to read Memorials at length.

2. If the King has not leisure to assist at any Council, the President of that Council, or he that makes the Report of the Affair may make his Report in short, or give him Abstracts of those Memorials, and read to him the Resolution of Council made, not upon those Abstracts, but upon the original Memorials read at length. Now he that makes the Report can never deceive the King in any Matter of Consequence, since he will have the President as a Check upon him, and will also have the Resolutions of the Council and the Abstracts of the Memorials that have been made with this Care and Fidelity, as his Judge.

O B J E C T I O N XXII.

This new Form of Government would be preferable to the old one, were it lasting; but it may be easily shewn that it can never be lasting: Interest and Power are Goods that can never be increas'd, but at the expence of the Interest and Power of others: It is natural for Men to labour to increase them, and the Ambitious do this more than

than any. The Presidents of Councils are Men, therefore to increase their Power and Interest at the expence of the Counsellors of State, they will take all the Measures possible to get the greatest part of the Business into their own hands, and have two ways to effect this that are very obvious. The first is, to accustom themselves to carry directly to the King, without Witnesses, and without communicating it to the Council, as much Business as they can. The second, is to make their Reports to the King of whatever has been transacted in Council without any Witnesses. It is evident, that they being by this means able to conceal the Reasons of the Party opposite to their own, or to weaken them as they think fit, they will easily make themselves Masters of the final Resolutions, and govern the King each in his own Province as much as ever the Demi-Visiers did the late King *Lewis XIV.* and they will effect this with the greater certainty, because he will not think that he is govern'd. And to conceal this way of acting, they will say, 1st, That some Affairs require immediate Dispatch. 2^{dly}, That others require Secrecy, and that therefore there is no need to suffer them to be canvas'd in full Council: and others, which tho they be of Consequence, are already decided to their hand; and in fine, that there are others which are so inconsiderable as not to deserve to take up the Debates of a whole Council: They will moreover say, that the Dispatch of Business is greater, that the King knows better what is to be done than the whole Council together; that there is need of a Council only in Affairs of the greatest Intricacy and Difficulty, and that there are few such to a Man of Genius and great Parts: In a word, they will never want plausible

ble Reasons. Moreover the Presidents by degrees will take upon them, each in his respective Province, the same Authority that the Demi-Visiers did under the late King; the Counsellors of State will be no more than their head Clerks as I may say; and thus the old Government will be settled amongst us under a different Name, and the Polyfynody degenerate into a Demi-Visiership.

If the King is infirm, lazy, and unactive, or given to his Pleasures, or ill-natur'd and hard to be pleas'd, he will more easily affect a President that can flatter him, is agreeable, witty, very complaisant and industrious, but withal ambitious, than another who is a more honest and resolute Man, but not so agreeable in his Manners, less interested and more laborious; and thus when the Places of Presidents come to be vacant, the King will unite two or three of them in his Person, and by insensible degrees the Visiership will be again set up amongst us. If the King has an Aversion to Labour, and grows old, he will be so much the more dispos'd to confide in him that offers to free him from all the Fatigue. Moreover the great Opinion the King has of his own Capacity, and of the want of it in others, he will be the more inclin'd to hearken to a President that would make him condemn the Advice of Councils, and even make him look upon some as lazy, Deriders, imprudent, or ignorant; and others as envious, factious, and mutinous, and some as capable even of Bribery and Corruption. In truth, if we only reflect on the one hand on the great Bent that Kings, as well as most Men, have to Laziness, Pleasure, and an over Confidence in themselves; and on the other, on the Ambition that is natural

ral to most Chief Ministers, all Monarchies naturally tend by their own Weight and Byass to a Visiership, and bear imperceptibly towards it, as all Republicks do naturally tend towards Monarchy.

Were we absolutely sure that we should have no Presidents, but who were very *Cato's*, that out of a Love for true Glory and Virtue, who are always inclin'd more to the Good of the State, than their own private Interest: I own, that my Objection would lose all its Force; but the more ambitious a Man is, the more he is capable of the deepest Hypocrisy, till he can shew himself in his own natural Colours with Impunity: and what is more common, than to see them aim with eagerness at the highest Posts, that are most infected with this sort of Ambition, that is much nearer ally'd to Vice than Virtue? After all, a Polysynody, this Form of Government so glorious in Speculation, must be lookt upon as a Government against the Nature of Things, and which by consequence can never be lasting; particularly whilst the Presidentship is fix'd, and the Power is not equally divided, or almost equally, amongst the Counsellors of State, the effecting which is a Secret that can never be found out. Since therefore the Polysynody is not lasting, it is better to hold to the old Form of Government to which we are used, and to make use of three or four Demi-Visiers, or to choose a First Minister, or a Prime Visier, who may chuse the other Visiers of the Bench as he thinks fit.

H

ANSWER.

A N S W E R.

This Objection has something plausible in it, but I shall shew that in reality it has no Solidity.

The Regent, as well as the late Duke of Burgundy, had no other View in establishing a Polyfynody, than to pitch upon a Form of Government which might let them into the Knowledge of the Truth of Facts, and improve them by the Lights of a great many able Men, by labouring very much with them all, and by being present at all the Debates upon the most important Affairs of State. I own, he never as yet has thought to bring it to that Perfection, as to make it preferable to the Viceroyship in the Reigns of unactive and voluptuous Princes; but the thing may be done, and as the most difficult part is over, what remains to be done is very easy.

N. 1. True it is that the Ambition of those that shall preside in the Councils, will make them always endeavour to increase their Interest and Power at the expence of the other Members of the Society; and if proper Means are not found out to direct and restrain this ungovern'd Ambition of Presidents that are too aspiring, they will by degrees overthrow the best Establishment that can be possibly fram'd. This is a Mischiefe that takes its Rise from the very Nature of Men; but there is a Remedy at hand, viz. to establish a perfect Equality amongst the Members, and to settle a Circulation of all the Parts and Provinces of Business, and chiefly of the Presidency. Thus each Council may nominate every two or three Years three Counsellors, out

of whom the Regent shall chuse one for President.

It is manifest that this is an infallible Remedy; for the Presidents then, that they may be chosen another time, will not dare to ineroach upon the Authority of those that may either give them, or refuse them their Votes at the next Election; and the more ambitious they are, the more they will fear to be rejected as such. Art may therefore thus rectify Nature; and the true Remedy is to make the Presidentship circulate.

N. 2. We have already said, that the Regent may easily order the Presidents never to speak to him, but of Affairs propos'd in Council, and that in the Presence of him that makes the Report, or of the Counsellors for the Week: and truly what is of so great Consequence, as not to be determin'd by the Regent or King, ought certainly first to be debated in Council; and if the President does design to say nothing but Truth to the Regent or King, or the General Council, why should he be unwilling to have a Witness of what he says?

N. 3. The Allotments of Business, it is true; are not equal, and some of them have four times more Authority than others have; and the Nature of Affairs is such that it cannot be otherwise. It is equally true that in this Sense it is impossible, that the Power can be equally divided amongst the Counsellors of the same Council; but the Circulation mention'd being once establish'd, it is evident that the Members having the Shares of Business that carry with them the greatest Authority, every one in his Turn, the dividing of that Authority will be render'd as equal by this Expedient as it is possible to be. Methinks such an Equality will be sufficient to

prevent the gradual ruin of an Establishment so advantageous to the general good, by the influence of private Interest.

This the Ambition of Counsellors of State can never be more diverted from the ruin of the Government; that Passion so natural to Man, and so advantageous, and at the same time so dangerous to Society, will be chang'd into a laudable Emulation, and turn to the Advantage of the King and Kingdom. Now to find out the Art to make the Passions of Men operate for the publick Good, even when they act most vigorously for themselves, is, as I have said, to have found out the grand Secret in Politicks, and what is of the greatest Importance and Difficulty in relation to this Establishment; and whenever the Regent will be pleas'd to make this admirable contrivance of causing the Shares of Business to circulate, and which is entirely his own Invention, something more general in practice, the Polysynody will be settled upon a solid and lasting Foundation, and the Objection against the Probability of its being lasting will lose its Force.

OBJECTION XXIII.

There is a great Obstacle against this Circulation of the Presidentship, which is, that it has not been settled from the beginning; and they who have counted that they were always to preside over others, will not be willing to submit to a President over them: particularly if the Presidents have Titles, would they take place after one who has none. Thus we see that this Circulation that looks so well in Speculation, is impossible in Practice.

A N S W E R.

N. 1. The Presidentship is not settled as unalterable, there has been no Declaration made about it; therefore the King may declare that it shall continue for the future but for two or three Years.

N. 2. Suppose the Presidents, tho without sufficient reason, expected to preside always, can there be an Expedient found out to indemnify them upon this Account? may not the Salaries be continued to the Ex-Presidents? may not they be made Members of the General Council, as we have said above? they may even hope to be chosen again. In fine, let what Price you will upon this Compensation which is only transitory, can it ever stand in Competition against an Advantage of the greatest Importance, which is to settle an Establishment, from which the Kingdom may expect the greatest Good upon a solid and lasting Foundation?

N. 3. A President that loves his Country more than his own Interest, does not pretend to such a Compensation in the Case, he contents himself with the second place, after having fill'd the first; he satisfies himself with the great Reputation he may have acquir'd in it. We see in the Reigns of Lewis XI. and of the Kings his Predecessors, of Changes in the first President in the Parliament and Chambers of Accompts: The first President one Year became the second President the Year following, and sometimes the third President the year after, and then sometimes became the first President again. But if he were continued longer than one Year, he was oblig'd to take out a new Commission. And can what has been once practis'd be look'd upon as impracticable? and tho there had been no Precedent of so useful a Regulation, does it follow that it should never be set on Foot?

4. I affirm, that a President, if he is a good Citizen, must needs be ready to serve his Country in the second Place, if the Laws that are made for the Preservation of Liberty and the improvement of Government do not allow him to continue in the first; nor will he require a Compensation in the Case, because he is a good Subject and a good Citizen; his Love for his Country inclines him to do it this Kindness without hopes of Reward, he resigns his Right with Pleasure, without insisting upon a Compensation: So generous, so disinterested a way of acting, is it self more honourable, and sets him higher in the Esteem of Men, which is in it self a sufficient Compensation. The great *Scipio*, when he was sent Lieutenant to his Brother in the War against *Antiochus*, did not demand a Compensation from the Commonwealth, because he serv'd as Lieutenant; for in the Eyes of all Men he was in a more glorious Post, and more rais'd by his Quality of Lieutenant than if he had been General. The great Glory of a good Citizen is to serve his King and Country best, whilst he is satisfi'd with the least Rewards; this is to cast a Slur upon all Rewards, and to carry the Contempt and Self-denial farther than his Competitors dare do. I don't blame those who will serve their Country well, and be well paid for it: these shew their Justice, but not their Love to their Country: whereas they that do it equal Services, and are contented with a great deal less, are more than just, they are good, they are beneficent to their Country, and undoubtedly they are a great deal more virtuous, and a great deal more praise-worthy than the former.

To

H.

begin. To say this *en passant*, a President with a Title, who is ready for the Good of his Country, to be under a Man who has no Title, is so far from doing any thing against his true Honour and Dignity, that he becomes much greater in the Eyes even of the common People, who are the nicest Judges of Virtue and Disinterestedness in Men. I saw such Sentiments as these in the late Monsieur de Vauban; but other Methods are to be found in a Country where the Love of the Publick is almost extinct, than what are adapted to our present Manners. Therefore I am of opinion, that the Presidents who shall prefer their private Interest to that of the King and State, should have a full and satisfactory Compensation.

N. 6. I own that the Punctilio in Men about Rank and Place is a very just Pretension; but then it must be own'd to be an inconsiderable private Concern, which ought never to obstruct the publick Affairs, especially when they are of great Importance: Therefore the King to avoid all Mortifications to private Persons, and all Damage or Injury to the Pretensions of different Corps about Rank and Place, need only decree by a publick Declaration, that the Place that any one takes in the Council shall never determine the Precedence any where else; then to sit in the best Place in Council will never prejudice the Counsellor of State, as to his Seat in Parliament, his Precedence at Court, or any other Places; and thus he never need to fear the Reproaches of his Brethren in any other Corps, and he will take his Place in Council according to the time of his Reception. Cardinals, Marshals of France, and Dukes, and Peers lose nothing of their Dignity and Rank which is their due in other Places, because in the French Academy they sit beneath

a private Member of it, and have for their President a Man of no Birth, and a younger Member than themselves.

By such a Declaration the Door of the Councils would be open'd to several very able Persons well affected to the publick Good, who have been kept out upon certain Scruples about their own Rank, and that of the Corps to which they belong. The Counsellors are deem'd equal in Council, as the Members of the Academy are in the Academy, because they have an equal Right of Voting; but out of the Council each Man takes his Rank that is his due. Thus the Rights and Pretensions about Precedency remain untouch'd, the Service of the State is carry'd on in its usual Channel, and suffers no Prejudice thereby.

8. Tho the Councils were forc'd to be without Members with Titles, the State could not suffer, but in one Case; which is, that it would be impossible to find amongst Persons of lower Rank, the same Capacity, and Application to Business, and Love for their Country, as are to be met with amongst Persons of that high Station; but I never yet saw one that was thorowly convinc'd of the Impossibility.

If the publick Revenues of a State were in a very great Confusion, and the publick Credit at a low Ebb, it would be very wise to place all, or almost all the Authority of the Council for the Revenue in the hands of the ablest Man, that he may apply the most expeditious Remedy to the Disorder; for setting things in order, is sooner effected by one than by a great many. But, of This settling an Authority in one alone, only regards a particular Council. 1^{stly}. It is never necessary but when Affairs are in great Confusion, which

which is very seldom. 3^{dly} As soon as this experienced Person has by his Application to order'd Matters, that the Charges of the State are regularly paid, as soon as Order is thus re-establish'd, and Credit restor'd, it will be more proper that every thing should be manag'd afterwards by a Plurality of Voices than by one alone; for then the Council of the Revenue would have the Advantage of the Advice of all the other Counsellors as well as the Experience of the ablest, since all are suppos'd to be equal to him, chiefly if afterwards the King pursues the Method of having the three ablest propos'd to him: for as the ablest Man alive is not infallible, his Brethren may possibly convince him of Mistakes into which he may fall, or at least may prevent these Mistakes being ever prejudicial to the State.

We may see then, that the Obstacles which offer against bringing to Perfection and establishing this new Form of Government, are so easily taken off, that they hardly deserve the Name of Obstacles.

OBJECTION XXIV.

An Establishment attended with so great Advantages would undoubtedly be lasting, could the French flatter themselves that they should always have wise Kings; but Rome her self had her Nero's, her Caligula's, and other mad Men of the same Rank; and why should not the like happen in other Places? They have Armies at their Devotion, they may put to death without Form of Trial, those who should complain of the Breach of the Laws, or should dare to make Remonstrances. Moreover, are the fundamental Laws of a State, and the best settled Rules of Govern-

Government, any thing more in the hands of a desperate and senseless Tyrant, than Rules of Lead that may be pull'd in pieces, and forc'd to bend at the Will and Pleasure of their Favourites.

A N S W E R.

Nero's are Monsters very seldom seen, and till we have such amongst us capable of acting so evidently against their own Interest, as to bear down or over turn the fundamental Laws, the State may in the mean while make great Advantage of the Continuance of this wholesom Establishment.

12. It is very possible that the Regent, or a King of France may sign the Treaty of European Polity, together with the other Powers of Europe, which Henry the Great invented to preserve the fundamental Laws of each Country. Thus this European Society would secure the Execution of the Imperial Capitulations in Germany, of the Acts of Parliament in England, and of the *Pacta Conventa* in Poland, why could it not also warrant the Execution of the regal Capitulations for this Form of Government, when it shall be made a fundamental Law of the State, and sign'd at the Coronation of our Kings; and after all to secure Kings from becoming Nero's, is to secure them and their Posterity from utter ruin.

N. 3. This Settlement of a Polysynody may be made a fundamental Law in an Assembly of the States, and sworn at the Coronation of our Kings, and become of equal Authority with the Salique Law, which gives our King all the Right he has to the Exclusion of the Defendants of the Daughters of our Kings.

SECTION XXV.
 What has been a great hindrance to the labouring to make advantageous Establishments for Kings, and for their Subjects, is the little Dependance that is to be had on Kings; a young, indiscreet, rash, and hot-headed Prince, push'd on by a parcel of giddy-headed young Men, who are his Flatterers and his Favourites, and supported by some ambitious Ministers, may overthrow in one Day what has cost a wise Prince ten Years of Sweat and Labour to settle and bring to Perfection.

Suppose that some great Politician has shewn to a Demonstration, that a Polysynody is much more advantageous to the King, than the Visiership, or the Demt-Visiership, if the Demonstration is not known to every body; if it is forgotten, what good will it do? If this Form of Government is not made a fundamental Law of the State, will the King and his Favourites ever vouchsafe to cast their Eyes upon the Demonstration? and how is it possible to make it a fundamental Law, but by decreeing in a full Assembly of the States, that the King shall swear the Observation of it, as he does of other fundamental Laws?

ANSWER.

What can hinder the Regent or King to give Orders, that such a Demonstration be made? what hinders when it shall be perfected to add Copies of the Edicts, Declarations, and other Statutes, that have contributed to the forming and accomplishing this Establishment? what hinders

ders the making this to be received in the States General as a Fundamental Law of Government? What hinders the depositing authentick Copies signed by him, not only of the Edicts and Declarations, but also of the Orders of the States General, and of the Fundamental Memorial of the Reasons of these Acts in the Registers, and Records of all the Parliaments and the superior Companies? IV. What hinders the causing all this to be printed, and taught in the Schools for Politicks, when there shall be any settled; that the great Advantages of this Law be ever present before our Eyes, and that no body may be so bold to offer at the repeal of it, without being sure of drawing upon himself the Contempt of all wise Men, and the general Hatred of the Nation?

O B J E C T I O N XXVI.

The Proposal you make to give to the Ex-Presidents a Seat and a Vote in the Debates of the other Councils, that they may be the better acquainted with different sorts of Business, and thereby capacitate themselves to fill a Place with Honour in the General Council, will deprive the particular Council where they were Presidents, of the Assistance of their Knowledge and Experience.

A N S W E R.

1. The Ex-President would not be oblig'd to withdraw wholly from the Council where he had presided; for that Council not sitting every day, he would only attend another Council on the days on which it did not meet.

2. If

22. If he did withdraw from his own Council, it would be to communicate his Knowledge and Labours to another, and the better to qualify himself to serve the State hereafter in the General Council. N. Moreover, the Place he quits, for example in the Council for the Revenue, to go into that for Trade, would be filled by an Ex-President from the Council of Trade, who would come to offer his Service in the Council for the Revenue. This Rotation of Ex-Presidents thro' the several Councils, would be a means to form those great Men, who would be capable of projecting Schemes of a much more extensive View, and far more regular, and would be a much greater and more ready Improvement of the Government.

3. The Ex-President, that should have no Design to sit hereafter in the General Council, would exempt himself, if he pleas'd, from learning any other sort of Business, in the other Councils, and might take upon him the Province that the new President held.

4. The most able and learned Men all agree, that one of the chief Causes, that contributed the most to the forming those great Men among the Romans, in the times of their Commonwealth, was their being train'd up and employ'd equally in the Affairs of the Civil and Military Government, and very often in that part of it also that regarded Religion. But now the Talents of our greatest Men are confined to one sort of Business, which is the Cause, that the best of them are not sometimes qualify'd to determine, with Safety and Knowledge, of the different useful Projects that may be laid before them, which is the best, and how much it deserves the preference of the rest.

5. The

5. The Gentlemen of the Sword will be very able to judge, which is the most advantageous of two Proposals that regard Military Affairs, but not well qualified to judge of the preference between an Establishment for the Army, and one of Civil Government or Trade, or relating to the Revenue, &c. Yet for want of this extent of Knowledge in each Counsellor of the General Council, it will often happen, that the less advantageous Resolutions will be preferred in the Council; and sometimes both Money and Time thrown away upon an Establishment of no consequence, whilst both the same Time and the same Money would be better laid out upon one, that would be a hundred times more advantageous.

6. Men are not so happily constituted, as not to have reason to fear some Inconveniencies, whatsoever Form of Government they pitch upon; but the most dangerous of all to them is, that wherein they who have the whole Authority in their hands, may abuse it with Impunity, and which I therefore call Despotism: Now each one in a Post, which he looks upon as fixed and secured to himself, may much more easily abuse his Power with Impunity, and practise there a sort of Despotism; nay, we find by experience, that a Man of a publick Character, if he thinks he is not to be called to an account for his Actions, suffers himself to be governed more by his Self-Interest and Caprice, than by Reason; that is to say, by any view to the publick Good: But if he fears lest a Successor, who is his Rival and Competitor, be to judge of his Actions, his Conduct will be far more circumspect, and by consequence more useful to his Country.

7. Look into the best Forms of Government, of the best constituted Religious Communities; why is there a Circulation of the Superior's Place throughout the whole Convent? because the Members of those Societies dread a Despotism, or absolute Power, as the Source of the greatest Mischiefs. For the Abuse of Power springs chiefly from two heads, either,

1st. Want of Knowledge, to see in all Circumstances what is best for the Society they govern. Or,

2^d. Want of Motives, to prefer the common Interest of the Society to their own: they may apprehend, lest, when they are out of Place, they may be reproach'd for the Faults they have done, or may expect and desire to be chosen a second time. Now this Apprehension, and this Desire, are Motives to them to govern their Society well, which Superiors, that are for Life, have not. And I am apt to think, that the chief Cause of the Corruption that has crept into Monasteries, is, that heretofore there was no such Circulation of the supreme Power in them; for their Abbots were for Life. Now an Abbot, that grew remiss, had no great difficulty of introducing by degrees a Relaxation of Discipline into the whole Monastery.

OBJECTION XXVII.

I am convinced, that during the Regency, the Regent will, when there is an Election to be made of new Counsellors of State into vacant Places, nominate Persons of the greatest Merit, and such that the Councils themselves would have chosen, had they a freedom of choice; but after the Regency, when a Door shall

shall be open'd to Favour and Recommendation, to Bribery and Corruption; these Places would be sold under-hand; not to honest Men, for they would scorn to purchase them; but to Villains, who having bought the Authority and Power of plundering with Impunity, will reimburse themselves again by selling Justice and Oppression.

I agree, that at present, when the Councils are filled with Members, whom the Reputation for Honesty and Knowledge have rais'd to this Dignity; if the Regent would give them Power to chuse their own Members, they would chuse such, as would be an Honour to their respective Societies; but will the Regent ever give up this Right of chusing? I say the same of the present King, or any King to come. Therefore to judge of what will be hereafter, from the Nature of Man, who will always love the Publick but very little, and themselves a great deal, and from the Interest that Favourites and Mistresses will always have; these Councils by degrees will be filled with self-interested and ignorant Persons; as it has actually happen'd in the Councils of *Madrid*, in less than an Age; because *Philip II.* that first founded them, or at least reformed them, never had a thought of giving those Councils the Power in his Lifetime of nominating to him three Persons for each Vacancy, and of forbidding all manner of Recommendations and Solicitations under the Penalty of being turn'd out of their Places.

It is certain, that the Members of a Society, that is made up of able and honest Men, know better, either by themselves or by their Friends, those that are worthy to be admitted, than the King could possibly do; it is more their Interest

rest to chuse those that may do honour to their Society, and be serviceable to the State of which they are a Part, than those that have but an indifferent Reputation for Honesty and Abilities.

It is also certain, that when the King is to chuse, his greatest Interest is, that his Choice may fall upon the best, or upon one of the three best that can be pitched upon. It is also certain in the last Place, that the King would spare himself a great deal of trouble, in not disappointing a hundred that he must refuse; and all their Friends, both Men and Women, and avoid the Concern it must needs be to do Injustice either to a private Person, or to the Publick; and also he would avoid doing himself a mischief, by not being forced to chuse a less worthy Person, to please one that is in favour.

But the Courtiers and Favourites will infallibly dissuade the Regent, or the King, from leaving the choice to the Councils themselves; and really a Favourite would be a great loser, if he, instead of having the liberty of chusing amongst three hundred bad ones, could only chuse one of three good ones, above exception, who would be neither one of his Relations, or Friends, or capable of promising him any Gratification.

We must expect, that in all Societies, private Interest is for ever acting with Vigour against the publick Good, and that it sometimes gets the better, and ruins the Society; unless the Legislator can, by wholesome Laws and Regulations, so order matters, that private Persons shall never be able to promote their own Interest, but as they procure the Good of others; and these are the Regulations that are so hard to find in every Instance, and much harder to settle and establish.

ANSWER.

N. 1. I don't see any reason, why the Regent should refuse to grant the Councils the right of choosing three Persons, and pass an Order to regulate the manner of this Election; if it is true, that it is the most proper means to make this Establishment lasting, and always fill the Councils with the best Men of the Kingdom.

2. For when it was a settled rule, that it should be out of the number of the Intendants, and Ex-Intendants, for instance, that most of the Counsellors should be chosen, and those prefer'd that have most distinguish'd themselves by their Labours for the common Good, and that the Recommendations of Women and Favourites should be little regarded; the Candidates would be more solicitous to acquit themselves well of their Duty in their Employ, and to acquaint themselves thorowly with whatsoever has a relation to them, than to lose the greatest part of their time in making their court to those who are in favour, and to the Favourites of a Favourite.

As Kings, if we would judge aright, have nothing to give away or dispose of, but as they are Judges of the Merits of those who have rendered, or may render, the greatest Services to the State; the great and only thing therefore they have to do, is to make this Judgment according to the strictest rules of Justice: And the exact observance of this Justice, may be said to be their greatest Interest, and the effect of the highest Virtue, as it is of the deepest Policy. I speak more fully in my Discourse for personal Honours, of the great Advantage that would accrue to the King, from allowing to the Companies a right of nominating three Members.

O B-

OBJECTION XXVIII.

It is true, that the Counsellors by this Circulation would have a knowledge of more things, but would be less knowing in any one; besides, they could not be well enter'd into their new Business in less than three Months, during which time Affairs must of necessity suffer by it.

ANSWER.

1. He that makes a report of any Business before the Council, does it much more fully when he is thorowly versed in many parts of Business, to which the Business he is concerned in has any relation, than when he has only a superficial Knowledge in them. Now most of the branches of Business in the same Council have a relation to one another, which it is of consequence to know thorowly, the better to chuse the Principles one is to go upon in the Determination: Now it is evident, that the best way to have a thorow Knowledge of any thing, is to view it from a more elevated Station, to discover from thence more easily its different Relations.

2. Every body knows, that a Man who has been employed in the Revenue, and who has been used to make Reports of, and dispatch Business of one kind, and has four or five Years together seen and transacted a great deal of that Business which he is going to be engaged in, will, in less than a Fortnight, be so thorowly entered into the Particulars of that sort of Business, as to be able from the beginning to make a very sensible Report, upon the Principles that are necessary to form a Conclusion.

3. As he who leaves that part of Business is thorowly versed in it, and the other Counsel-

lors have some knowledge of it too, no body can fear lest the Council should be misled to take the wrong side, upon the Reports of one that is lately entered into the Office; Affairs therefore will be as readily dispatched, and determined with as much Wisdom in the very beginning of such a Change, and therefore they will not suffer by it.

4. Tho they should suffer a little from thence in the beginning, that Damage would be sufficiently made up by what would be gained afterwards by an Increase of Knowledge.

5. Tho this Damage could be supposed not to be made up afterwards, which is suffer'd in the beginning of such Circulation, yet that can never be set against half the Inconveniencies that are consequent to the contrary Method of Non-Circulation, or to all the positive Advantages of a Circulation that we have been speaking of.

OBJECTION XXIX.

I agree, that it is proper, that the Clerks or Secretaries change also their Allotments of Business, to prevent their evil Practices; but if some of the old Secretaries do not serve in the same Office, who shall enter the new Counsellor into the Business?

ANSWER.

I suppose there should be in each part of Business one Secretary, and two Under-Secretaries; it will be sufficient to leave the Secretary eight days in the Office, to enter the new Counsellor into the Business, and to instruct the two Under-Secretaries at the same time; and in eight days time, the new Secretary will be sufficiently enter'd into his new Business, not
only

only by his superior, but also by his two Under-Secretaries; and when there occurs any Doubt, or any Difficulty is to be cleared, the old Secretaries know very well where to meet. And all this may be done, without any great Prejudice to the Business, or the Concerns of private Persons.

The Secretaries also, thus improving by one another, will become more expert and ready in their Business, and the Work will be much more easy: which on the contrary, will be a fresh Advantage in the discharge of Business.

In a word, should not the Regent be as yet fully satisfied either about the Advantages of the Circulation, or the Possibility of it, he need only order some one of those that don't approve it, to put their Reasons in Writing; and then cause the *Pro* and *Con* to be examined by the Council of Examination. This is a natural Method, wherein all Difficulties may be cleared, and all Obstacles that are not insurmountable remov'd; which Method the King will always have at hand, whenever the Council shall be brought to a degree of Perfection.

O B J E C T I O N XXX.

The Council for Religion would be of extreme Advantage to the State, were it always employed to find out the Means of reconciling the sacred Maxims of Religion, with the reasonable Designs of Politicks; and to make the whole tend to the Practice of mutual Benevolence and Charity, as the common and chief Object of both: the chief aim of the one being to make Men happy in the present Life; and of the other, to make them happy in that which is to come.

N. This Council would be very serviceable to the Church and State, if Rewards were dispensed to those who should give in the best Memorials, to make the fountest Politicks agree still more and more with the most uncorrupt Manners and Discipline, and to make them unite more closely together; for there are an hundred things of consequence in both which require very good Regulations, in which they differ widely from one another. This Council would be of great use, were it to propose to those that stand for Benefices, the great Services they would do to Church and State, by making good Memorials and other useful Works; particularly by setting the Usurpations of the Church of Rome in a proper Light, and clearing the Difficulties which attend that Controversy; by which Labours they might show the difference of their Talents. This Council would be of farther advantage, if it had Power, after full Knowledge of the Cause, of nominating to the King the three best Persons for every Benefice, always observing this Rule, viz. To prefer to the great Abbies and Bishopricks, those that had both Birth and Merit, to those that have Merit only.

N. But to effect this, it would be necessary, that this Council were composed of a greater number of Bishops, and of Lay-Counsellors, who should be chosen from out of the ablest and most learned, not only in Politicks, but also in the Discipline of the Church, to give to this Assembly a greater weight of Authority over Peoples Minds: But as it is far from being so, this Council is hardly of any use at all.

Were we to look into the Fortunes of the Under-Ministers, and their Clerks, who had a share in the publick Affairs during his Ministry,

ANSWER.
N. This Council may have an additional number of Counsellors; all the Matters proposed may be debated in it; it may, as well as the other Councils, be daily brought to a greater degree of Perfection: It is already of great use, but it may be still made much more useful and advantageous.

OBJECTION XXXI.

The State is over-loaded with Debt, and yet the Salaries of the Counsellors of State, and their Clerks, amount to more than fourteen hundred thousand Livres; whereas, under the Demi-Visiership, the Salaries did not arise to seven hundred thousand Livres.

ANSWER.

1. The difference can never be above five hundred thousand Livres, which is inconsiderable in comparison to the great Advantages that attend the Polysynody.

2. Every body knows, that the Vissers and Demi-Vissers got immense Riches during their Ministry; and I am willing to believe, that they did not get them by unlawful means: But which way soever they did it, whether by Presents, Gifts, or Gratifications, it is agreed, that it was always at the State's Expence. The Cardinal *Mazarine*, in eighteen Years time, got together more than thirty six Millions of Livres, which he left to his Nephews and Nieces, besides his vast Expences in his Family; so that he raised two Millions *per Annum* upon the Publick, for his own use.

3. Were we to look into the Fortunes of the Under-Ministers, and their Clerks, who had a share in the publick Affairs during his Ministry,

we shall find that they altogether did not get less than their Master; much like the Branches of a Tree, that altogether increase, and well nigh weigh as much as the Body: So that instead of saying, that the Viceroyship cost the State five hundred Thousand Livres less than the Polyfynody does, one may on the contrary, with good reason say, that the Polyfynody saves the Government three Millions five hundred Thousand Livres a Year at least. I don't bring for an Instance, the Demi-Viceroyship of the last Reign, because I will not disoblige Families which I love, respect, and honour; and besides, what I have said in proof against the Viceroyship, will be of equal, or very nigh of equal weight against the Demi-Viceroyship.

4. The Reason that the State saves so much is, 1st. That the Counsellors of State neither will, nor durst make any unlawful Gain, or receive any Presents from the Kings Subjects: But it is notorious, that the Clerks heretofore might receive them, particularly when the Under-Ministers their Masters had a Share; and the Under-Ministers themselves were in no danger, provided the First Minister, or the Viceroy, had his Portion too. The Counsellors of State have too watchful an eye over one another for any one of them to dare to act contrary to the strictest Duty; thus it may be said, that their mutual Jealousy is of service to the State. Should the King give any Present or Gratification to one of them, he would offend them all, who either deserv'd, or think they deserv'd, as much. Now the Apprehension the King would have of disobligeing the greatest number by such Distinctions, will be of an Advantage to the Publick: I therefore think there ought to be no abatement of their Salaries.

3. Tho the Polysynody should stand the Publick in Wages and Salaries, twice or four times as much as the Visiership, yet if there is not a fourth part of the Knaveries and Embezzlements committed in the Polysynody, as there were in the Visiership and Demi-Visiership, if the Polysynody brings an hundred times more advantage to the State, is it possible that any one can grudge an Expence, or rather a sort of Advance, that shall bring him in an hundred for one?

N. I don't deny but that some Counsellors of State might be more usefully employed; but that is not the Fault of a Polysynody in general, but a small defect perhaps in a particular Polysynody, and is easily remedy'd.

6. Tho it should be proper to retrench one half of the Salaries of the Council of Regency, and of the Presidents, for four or five Years, and a quarter part of those of the other Offices, till the Revenues of the State were improv'd, and the Charges lessened, which I don't absolutely agree to; this would prove nothing against a Polysynody in general, or against the Polysynody of this Monarchy. It is only an abatement in regard to the present State of Affairs, it is only a particular accidental Case, that will not last.

N. And still it does remain certain, that a Polysynody is a Form of Government, in which the Ministers of State, tho never so vitious, will find it very hard to get immense Estates at the expence of the King and People; and therefore that it is a Form of Government the least chargeable to the Kingdom. And this is the one and twentieth very real Advantage of the Polysynody, which I never thought of till the Objection brought it into my Mind.

OBJECTION XXXII.

The Polysynody has been so far from affording more time and leisure to the Regent than the late King had, that his Labours are increased; he has the signing of Ordinances, and the ordinary Dispatches of the State, as the late King had, which takes up a great deal of his time every day; and also a great many Determinations to make, which the Demi-Vissiers did. Now such a vast quantity of Business is above the strength of any Man, who has not the same superior Genius and Readiness in Business as he has: Can we assure our selves on the other hand, that the Regent will leave, as it were by Succession, the same great Mind he is Master of, to the Kings who come after him? or can France flatter her self with so much Happiness? When a Prince then, who is but of a middling Genius, has once felt the weight of Government, and the fatigue of Business, he will soon look for a chief Minister, to ease himself of so heavy a Load. Is not this true in the ordinary course of Nature? Kings therefore hereafter will never support your fine Establishment.

ANSWER.

N. What should hinder the Regent from appointing Commissioners out of every Council, with Power to sign all the ordinary Dispatches of that Council for him, and to make that Commission circulate every three Years? So that there shall be two old ones always in Place, when a new one is chosen; and thus never to have recourse to the King or Regent for signing, but in extraordinary Cases, or when the three Commissioners can't agree. Are not the Contracts at the Town-House signed by Commissioners or Bearers of these Powers?

1. May

2. May not in case of a Difference among the Commissioners, the matter in dispute be decided in the General Council, by a Majority of Voices, even when the King is not present? For a Majority has the same effect as an Unity of Person. May not these Decisions, which the Regent makes, when they are numerous, and of no great consequence, be determined finally by each particular Council? And when they are of great consequence, by the general Council, even when the King is not there, as advantageously for the State as if the King transacted them alone? Now following this Method, will the Load of Government be so intolerable to the King? It will all then fall upon the Councils, and every thing may be managed according to antient Rules, till matters are brought to a greater degree of Perfection by new Regulations. Thus the Machine of Government will move, and very regularly too, by it self.

N. 3. I am sensible, that as long as Gratifications, Places, Benefices, Pensions, and the other Rewards of the State, are not entrusted with the different Councils, that each in their Province may nominate the three properest Persons: A young King may do a great deal of Injustice in these Particulars thro' Ignorance, and by consequence may commit a great many Faults against his own Interest, and thus weaken very much the chief Springs of Government; But what should hinder them from taking such wise Measures?

N. 4. What causes the greatest Fatigue to the Regent is, how to find out a way to lessen hereafter the King's Labour on the one hand, and how they may govern without Vissers on the other; but, God be thanked, this is not above the Strength and Abilities of this Prince, and
would

would be less so, if he would gain himself more leisure and time by turning over to Commissioners the greatest part of that Business, which he till now has been pleased to take upon himself, with intent no doubt to inform himself more thorowly in the Detail of Business. Then he would have time enough to meditate with Advantage upon those Affairs which require the greatest Vigour of Mind, and Strength of Application.

5. I don't deny but that it is very proper for a King in the beginning of his Reign, to have labour'd about certain things that are the proper Duties of a Minister, or even of a first Clerk; one has a better Notion of general Business, by thus entring into the particular Branches of it. A General who has run thro' the several Degrees and Posts in an Army becomes a better General by that means; but if he continues to employ those Hours that are due to the general and more important Affairs, that employ a great deal of time, and can't be well done but by himself, in the Particulars of small Concern, which others may do as well as he, such a one could never be call'd a good General, because he would want common Sense. The first thing a Minister sees when he enters into Office, is, that he cannot do every thing by himself, and that of consequence he is oblig'd to turn over the less important Business to Clerks and those that are under him, tho he sees they will commit Faults which he never should be guilty of. Kings, as well as their Ministers, have only certain Hours in the Day to work in; now he must necessarily neglect what is of greater Consequence, and which he alone can do if he resolves to do himself what his Councils and Ministers may do, tho perhaps not so well as he: Is it not then to want common Sense,

Sense, to neglect Business of the greatest Importance to mind the less?

OBJECTION XXXIII.

The more expert and ready the Regent is in Business, the more easily he is dispos'd to think it so to any body else, but he is mistaken; and what is fatal in this Case is, that this Mistake of his will make him neglect to find out all the possible Means to give a constant and lasting Motion to his Machine, and what is of the last Consequence for him to do, to give it a Motion independent of himself.

And therefore it is very much to be fear'd, that his noble Machine will not out-live him long; he must accustom himself to entrust every thing to his different Councils, and those Councils must be practis'd in determining what he is now oblig'd to do alone; he must find out Means that his Establishment may be able to act without his Assistance in the ordinary Course of Business: But it is very much to be fear'd, that he will never be able to find out the Means to make what he now does by himself, to be done near so well by the particular or general Councils.

ANSWER.

1. I own that this Objection is the strongest that has been made to me about the likelihood of this Establishment being lasting; and it must be acknowledg'd that it would be a great Defect of Perfection in any Machine, if the Workman could not leave it, and it could not continue its Motions without him: but I don't see but this may possibly be done by degrees.

2. I should think he must be very much concern'd to make so noble an Establishment lasting; he, who has almost all the Honour of the Invention, and who has absolutely all the Ex-

execution of it: and what is yet more, has conquer'd Difficulties which really no body but himself could overcome.

3. It behoves him to discharge himself as much as possible of all ordinary and private Business, that he may have sufficient Leisure to employ his Thoughts upon new Regulations, that is upon general and extraordinary Affairs. After all, the Regent himself is to answer this Objection, not I: he, and no body else, is to give to this great and glorious Establishment all that Solidity it deserves; and I am the first to foretel its ruin, even before the Regency is expir'd, if by deep Thought and unweary'd Pains he does not bring it to that Perfection that it necessarily requires.

N. 4. I agree, he cannot by himself see how necessary it is to us; but why should not he try for a Week to discharge himself entirely of the ordinary Business in any one Branch, and then see what might be better done; and thus put one particular Council in a Condition to transact Business, as well as it can ever be expected to be done without the Regent's Assistance? May not he make this Trial for a Fortnight, and do the same by degrees in regard to every particular Council, and in regard to the General Council?

N. Lewis XIII. did not concern himself in the Government, but left every thing to his First Minister. Now what should hinder the Regent from entrusting to different particular Councils, and to the General Council, what his Grandfather entrusted to one Man only, since there would be this great Difference in the Case, viz. that the Regent would be labouring every Day in still giving better Directions, and managing his Councils by wise Regulations, which is a Province proper for the Mind that governs; where-

whereas *Lewis XIII.* was so far from governing his Minister, that he was govern'd by him.

N. 5. The Regent seeing the Machine move thus of it self, would be at leisure to remark what might be yet added to it, and what taken away: Thus he would frame a Master-piece in Politicks, and all this is very possible for him to do: What he has already done, is incomparably more difficult than what he has to do. Thus I dare foretel, he will never leave his Work imperfect, and will by his Wisdom and Foresight make it so solid and durable, as to be able to resist all the Storms, that either the Folly or want of Wisdom in *France* shall be hereafter able to raise against it.

O B J E C T I O N XXXIV.

What would the Regent have to do for the Good of the State, he who has so superior a Genius, and is so able to raise himself above all common Rules, and to improve the best concerted Schemes, if he were not to employ himself in determining the particular and ordinary Affairs of State that now take up the greatest part of his time, and were he to let the Councils provide for the current Business.

A N S W E R.

N. 1. How great soever his Abilities may be, he will not of a long time be able to settle Matters, so that the Councils shall stand in no need of his Assistance in managing the ordinary and current Business, as well as when he had the sole Management of it: And as the finding out all the properest Means upon this Head, and reducing them to Practice, may in truth be lookt upon as a Master-piece in Politicks; so the Work is in it self so great, that it must needs employ him for several Years.

N. 2.

N. 2. Suppose he could compass this after some time, might he not still be employ'd in the extraordinary Affairs of State; that is to say, in forming new Establishments, and in improving the old ones; and chiefly in bringing to Perfection the Scheme of *European Polity* amongst the Sovereigns of *Christendom*? Are they not these sorts of Labours that of themselves procure inconceivable Advantages to States, and shew to the Universe the Extent of the exact Judgment, the Courage and Resolution of the Minds of those Princes that put them in execution? Among these extraordinary Labours I place the Improvement of the Polysynody, if ever the Regent be able to make it lasting; and also the Council for the Examination of Political Memoirs, or of the Improvement of Politicks.

N. Unactive Princes, and of a narrow Genius, will be able to preserve the Kingdom more easily in health and Vigour by means of this wise Establishment; whilst industrious Kings, and of a sublimer Mind, having more time to spend in extraordinary Affairs, will be in a better Capacity of putting the Kingdom in infinitely a better State than they found it.

For to be able to find out the Means to make others execute what one has been forc'd to do one's self, as to the Detail of Business, to gain every Day more of that precious Time to be laid out in examining the Machine in gross and its principal Parts; thereby to rectify what appears dislocated, and either to give it a more free and vigorous Movement, or increase its Springs; or in fine, hinder their clashing with one another: To undertake, I say, and to go thro' with these extraordinary Labours that are so difficult and of such Consequence; this is properly the Province that great Kings and sublime Minds ought

ought to be employ'd in. The Regent's first Concern, 'tis true, is to put things in order, and upon such a Foot that the ordinary Course of daily Business may be well regulated in the Councils, and directed to the greater Advantage of the State; but when this is done, he ought to know that the least Step towards a great Design is often a thousand times preferable to a few petit Regulations in particular Affairs; and he ought to be able to make others do the greatest part of that, which if he could do himself, would be too great a Burden for him; whereas a Prince of a lower Genius, who is not able to settle this regular Method, as to the common course of Business, is himself oblig'd to act as a Minister or Clerk, when he ought to act as Master and chief Director.

OBJECTION XXXV.

Were a Polysynody so advantageous to the State, should not we see in the Revenue such Order settled that the current Charges might be regularly paid to all the Creditors of the State at the Terms of Payment, without any difference thro' Favour or Recommendation, just as the Rents have been always paid at the *Hôtel de Ville*? Should not we then find a sixth or an eighth Part at least of the Revenue apply'd every Year, either in paying in the Principal, or in some publick Works, or in forming Establishments that would be much more advantageous to the State than most of these Reimbursements would be.

To effect this, there were only three ways to be taken, either to lessen the Disbursements answerable to the Subsidies that are in being, or to increase those Subsidies answerably to the Disbursements to be made, or to lessen the Disbursements and increase the Subsidies. All this is
K
self-

self-evident; but as long as the Disbursements of the State are not fully and regularly paid, can it be expected that publick Credit should be restored? Of what Advantage then has your Polysynody been?

our Remedies **A N S W E R**

This Objection turns wholly upon what the Council of the Revenue has done, or has not done; and the Blame laid upon that Council can in reason fall upon the particular Polysynody that the Regent has settled; and much less upon a Polysynody in general that may be improv'd every Day. In the late Reign, when the Council for the Revenue was manag'd by one single Man, were the current Charges better paid? were not most of the Wages, Pensions, and Salaries eight Years in Arrears? Therefore the Polysynody is not the occasion of the Non-Payment. I dare be bold to say, that if the Council for the Revenue has not as yet chosen any of the three Expedients, it is not because each of the Members have not seen that they must come to that at last; but because they all found very great Inconveniencies, either in lowering the Interest and Principal of the King's Creditors, or in increas'ing the Subsidies; so that it is not so much the Fault of this Council, if the Measures already taken are not effectual; but the Nature of the Disease, that cannot be eased without some new painful Operations, such as the Council would fain spare the Persons that are concern'd. For what a Grief would it be to the King's Creditors to see their Principal and Interest lessen'd a second time? What Sorrow to the rest of the Subjects, to see the Taxes augment'd even in time of Peace, only to pay the King's Creditors? Ought then the Council to be blam'd

to have defer'd so painful an Operation in hopes of finding out some other Remedy?

4. A transitory and accidental Inconvenience in one Council, which thro' the Necessity of the Case they will every Day be forc'd to find out Remedies for, is not an Inconvenience that can stand in Competition with the Establishments of the other Councils, or even of that Council itself; 'tis as if any one would prove, that a certain Machine was not a good one, and of no use, because it wanted a little bigger Wheel, or because some part of it was accidentally out of order; but it is no strange thing to see People that suffer, reason ill: The Revenues of the State are not as yet equal and upon a level with the Charges of the State, say they; therefore a Polysynody is no ways preferable to a Viscership or a Demi-Visership. A pleasant way of arguing indeed! If it were a good one, it would be always of equal Force; but this will vanish and appear extravagant whenever the Charges and the Revenue are brought to a Ballance and Equality.

OBSECT ION XXXVI

A Multitude of Councils divides the Power, therefore weakens it.

ANSWER.

1. Division never weakens Power, but when they in whose hands it is oppose one another, and endeavour to ruin the Power of the contrary Party, to raise themselves upon their Ruins; but in a Polysynody the Portion of Power intrusted with one Council is employ'd only to execute the Resolutions of that Council, and in no wise to ruin the Power and Authority of another Council.

26. This Inconvenience of dividing Power would be much more to be apprehended, were the King to chuse 7 or 8 Ministers instead of 7 or 8 Councils for the different Branches of Business; for these Demi-Visiers having no other Witnesses of their Conduct in their respective Provinces, but common Clerks, who are their Creatures, they would act more vigorously and resolutely against one another's Authority, than ever any one Council could do to destroy the Authority of the rest; and the reason of this is so plain, that I shall not waste my time in proving it.

27. We don't see that the Authority is in any manner weaken'd in Commonwealths, where there are as many Councils as there are Branches or Heads of Business; the Proof therefore taken from the Government's being weaken'd by thus dividing the Power into different Councils, is only a Sophism, grounded upon the Equivocation of the words, *divided Power*, which has two different Meanings: a Power divided among several Persons who endeavour to ruin one another, weakens a Government, this is beyond dispute; but a Power divided into several Parts, that are disposed in such a manner that they altogether conspire to one certain End, which is the greater Advantage of the State; is so far from weakening a Government, that on the contrary it strengthens it, by uniting in its Service the Forces of ten times a greater Number of Persons equally capable, who will be so much the less liable to be sway'd by their private Interests from the End they should tend to, as they could never do it with Impunity. They would be constant Checks to one another, they would proceed in Company, and a Company can never go but towards the Interest of the Majority, which is the Interest of the Publick: A Company may

be mistaken in the Means, but can never commit a false Step, and are in a manner infallible in the Aim and Design; whereas a Vicer may mistake in the Means, much sooner than an entire Company of Men equal to him in Knowledge can: For as he acts without Witnesses, and may in a thousand Instances with Impunity, prefer his private Interest to the publick Good, he must of Necessity be oftner in the wrong, both as to his Design and End, as well as in the Means, than such a Company can possibly be. This seems to me to be a Demonstration to any one that knows what Demonstration is, and it would be in vain for me to say more for the sake of any one that is incapable of knowing it.

O B J E C T I O N XXXVII

Were there in every Council Counsellors assistant, as the Masters of the Request are in the Courts of Justice, when there happen'd any Vacancy; as for instance, in the Council of the Revenue, the Counsellors of that Court might with Safety chuse three from among the Counsellors Assistant, who had shewn either in the Motions and Reports made, or in their Debates; or in a word, by their whole Behaviour, the most Knowledge, Judgment, Moderation, Temper and Probity: but not being sufficiently acquainted with the Candidates, how should they be able to propose the three best of them to the King to fill the Vacancy, or where will you get ten or twelve Candidates for each Council that will assist regularly there, and act sometimes without Salaries; or how will you find them Salaries without burthening the State.

K 3 A N S W E R.

ANSWER.

N. 1. The Masters of the Request buy their Places, and yet have little or no Salaries; notwithstanding, there are enough to be found who are very glad to have the Honour to assist in Council, because these Places distinguish them, and give them hopes of being made Counsellors of State in the Courts of Justice: and why should there not be enough to be found to attend the Council of Trade, the Revenue, and the other Councils for the same Account, and with the like Prospect.

N. 2. If the King resolves to form the Council of Regulations, these Counsellors Assistant might have a Seat in the different Offices of that Council; and as such, they would be entitled to Salaries, as I have propos'd in another Treatise; and then certainly the Election of Counsellors of State might be made with Safety of Persons of the greatest Merit.

A Recapitulation of the Whole.

If the Form of Government in the two last Reigns have no Advantages in it but what are in a Polysynody; and if on the contrary this new Form of Government have a great many, that neither the Visiership nor the Demi-Visiership can have; one may conclude that the Polysynody upon many Accounts ought to have the preference of the other two: But I believe I have shewn it evidently enough, that those that make their Reports of Business will not so frequently be deceiv'd themselves, or endeavour to deceive others in the Facts they are to relate; and therefore the Decisions grounded upon Errors in fact, and which are so prejudicial to the State, will not be so frequent. That the Conferences and the Freedom

of Contradiction that always is amongst Equals, will give a great deal more Light to the finding out and choosing the best Measures and most effectual Expedients in doubtful and intricate Affairs, that Ministers by being oblig'd to give their Opinions in Publick, will be by the private Motives of Self-Reputation, influenc'd to give them a great deal more constantly for the publick Good.

That by there being in the Polysynody an incomparably greater Number of Persons imploy'd for the publick Good than under the Visiterhip, either of those that are to be Members of the Councils, or of those that shall aspire to that Honour, and by establishing a Method of proposing three of the most worthy Persons by their Equals to obtain these Places, Employs, and Rewards of the State, there will be rais'd a greater Emulation amongst all Persons who shall render the greatest Services to their Country, and each Officer will apply himself with more Industry to furnish his Mind with Knowledge and Abilities necessary for the Service, than to procure to himself a Title to them that is none of his own by Recommendations, which for the future will be unserviceable.

That the Interests of the King and People will be more nearly link'd together, and that the Government will be render'd more happy to those that are govern'd, and by consequence more comfortable and lasting to him that governs.

That the Interest of Women will be much less to be apprehended in the Administration of the Affairs of State.

That the Counsellors of State will not have the same Interest as the Visiers had, to desire that the King should live in Idleness and Luxury, without ever applying himself to the Affairs of Government.

That the King should live in Idleness and Luxury, without ever applying himself to the Affairs of Government.

That the Power being more divided, the weaker Subjects will find a great many more Protectors against those in Power; so that there will be much fewer Oppressions and Injustices from either corrupt or prejudic'd Demi-Visiers.

That the King employing a whole Council, and not a single Minister in the Branch for Military Affairs, he will be much less engag'd to undertake Offensive Wars without just reason; and by consequence we shall draw upon ourselves much fewer from our Neighbours.

That the Inconveniencies arising from the Weakness of Kings, when they are too young, or the Decay of Princes when too old, will be much less felt; because the Councils that never die, and never feel the Defects of Age, will support the Authority, and with an equal and steady hand will always steer the Course of the ordinary and common Affairs of State; so that the Monarchy will ever enjoy even in the times of the greatest Weakness, all the Advantages of a Republican Government, which is immortal; with this Prerogative in the mean time, of having the Assistance of a wise laborious Prince in all extraordinary Affairs, *i. e.* in new Establishments and Regulations, whenever he comes to the Fulness and Vigour of his Age.

That Kings being surrounded with greater Lights, will not have less Authority; but by having a clearer View of their own true Interest, will more frequently avoid taking wrong Measures.

That the People seeing so many Counsellors that are wise, just and zealous for the publick Good, will obey with the greater Readiness and Pleasure; and thus the King's Authority will receive a new and very great Addition.

from

That

That our Neighbours, who are inclin'd to Peace, will more willingly enter into defensive Alliances with a Government in which it is the more particular Interest of the Counsellors themselves to avoid War, and maintain Peace, and whose Administration of its own Nature tends to be upon the defensive Abroad, and to improve the Laws and Civil Government at home.

That by giving to each Council an Authority to decide Affairs finally, that are of very little Consequence to the State, but are of great Importance to private Persons, the three fourths and an half of Business will be decided quickly and without Appeal, as they are in the Courts of Justice; and that there being thus an eighth Part of the Affairs, *i. e.* to say those which are of the greatest Consequence, that will ever be brought before the King in a full general Council, they will be examin'd by two Councils instead of one; *i. e.* they will be examin'd answerably to their Importance: It will ensue, that what ought to be dispatch'd quickly will be so, but that which deserves more Attention, and does not require so great Dispatch, will be determin'd more leisurely, and with greater Deliberation: so that by this Means two Extremes will be brought to agree, that ought ever to be united in a good Government, Dispatch for the greatest part of Business, mature Deliberation and sufficient Examination for the rest; because there are always in all Governments two very different sorts of Affairs, which under pain of Male-Administration ought to be manag'd very differently.

That it was possible to frame a good Regulation to settle the Distinction between these two sorts of Affairs, and that such a Regulation might receive considerable Additions and Improvements from

from every particular Council, to acquire the greatest Quickness and Dispatch in Affairs, either less urgent, or less important, on the one hand, or to find sufficient time for a thorough Examination of Affairs that are less urgent and of greater Importance on the other.

That an industrious King making all common and daily Affairs, either in Peace or War, to be decided with Dispatch and Care by each of his eight Councils, or by the Council-General, without an absolute Necessity of his being there, he will have incomparably more Leisure to weigh and finish the more extraordinary Affairs of Government, which alone will be able to raise his Reputation in the World, by procuring to his Subjects new Advantages by such Regulations and Establishments.

That they that shall be concern'd in publick Business will have much less Opportunity of being guilty of ill Practices, and of enriching themselves at the Expence of the Publick by unlawful Means.

That the State will suffer much less from the Sicknes or Absence of a Counsellor of State, than it would from a Visier, or Demi-Visier; because the Labours of those that are in health, and give their Attendance, will fully supply the Absence or want of Health in others.

That the Provinces in Business of most of the Counsellors of State, may for the future circulate amongst them, from which great Advantages will accrue to the Kingdom; because there will be less Negligences and fewer evil Practices in the Management of Business, a great deal more Emulation, Industry and Knowledge in the Counsellors, a much greater Equality in Power, and by Consequence much more Freedom in the Debates;

Debates, and that this Equality will render this excellent Form of Government much more lasting. That several excellent Establishments that were impossible in the preceding Government, and amongst others, that of a Council for the Improvement of Politicks, and for the Examination of Memoirs concerning Reputations and Establishments, are become much more possible, and may be much more easily brought to bear, and that this Establishment will produce a much greater Number of useful Persons of Quality, who will apply themselves with Care and Success to improve the Administration.

That under the late Forms of Government no body durst teach, nor had any Convenience of teaching Politicks. And that notwithstanding the State could never have any very able Persons without considerable Improvements of that Science, either in pulick Places, or in the Councils, in comparision to what it might have if there was given a full Liberty of teaching, and there were great Opportunities of Learning and Rewards settled for any Improvement in that Science, that were proportion'd to the great Advantage of it.

That the Viceroyship can never be brought to a State of Perfection, because by the Death or by the displacing of an able Viceroy, that was zealous for the publick Good, the best Maxims and most useful Establishments would often be destroy'd by an unqualify'd and vicious Successor; but that in a Polysynody, Councils being immortal, good Maxims would be so too; and that thus this Form of Government can every Day acquire new Degrees of Perfection, without losing what was already got, which alone is an invaluable Advantage it has above the Viceroyship.

That

That it was of vast Consequence to the publick to settle Degrees in the Ministry, as there were in the Army; that this Establishment was impossible in the Viceroyship or Demi-Viceroyship, whereas it was very practicable in a Polysynody.

In fine, I have demonstrated, that in this new Form of Government in which the Authority may be pretty near equally divided amongst many Councils, there is much greater Security for the Continuance of the Royal Family upon the Throne, than in a Government where all the Authority of the King is wholly united in the Person of one single Minister.

Since therefore the Viceroyship and the Demi-Viceroyship has no Advantage but what is to be found in the Polysynody; but on the contrary has a great many Disadvantages very considerable that a Polysynody is not liable too! And since this latter has so evidently so many great Advantages as we have now shewn it has, we may conclude that the Kingdom, and particularly all sensible French Men, and all good Men that are now alive, will see with universal Joy the Establishment of the Polysynody; and that they who shall come after us will be convinc'd by this Discourse, that this Form of Government, as well for him that governs, as for those that are govern'd, is the most advantageous and most lasting of all the Schemes that have been hitherto follow'd, or even have been ever contriv'd and invented; and this is what I undertook to prove to demonstrate to them.

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